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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD and 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES 
CORPORATION and JEEP 
CORPORATION, LARRY ANDERSON, 
VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 19,695 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON REHEARING 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Appellee Stephen Whitehead respectfully submits this brief 
for consideration by the Court in its rehearing of this case. 
This brief will incorporate and restate, with modifications, 
Whitehead's arguments made in his Petition for Rehearing dated 
February 28, 1989, and in Appellee's Reply to Appellant's Answer 
to Petition for Rehearing dated April 13, 1989. Whitehead will 
not reargue in this brief the points which were affirmed on 
appeal. 
Appellee (petitioner on rehearing) Stephen Whitehead will 
be referred to herein as "plaintiff" or as "Whitehead." The 
claims of Deborah Whitehead were settled at trial, and she was 
not a party to the appeal. Appellants (respondents on rehear-
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ing) American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep Corporation will 
be referred to compositely as MAMC/Jeepfl or "defendants." 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is a civil case which was tried to a jury. Defendants 
appealed, and this Court reversed the verdict and judgment in a 
divided opinion. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 101 
Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Feb. 2, 1989). Whitehead filed a petition 
for rehearing on February 28, 1989. (Whitehead had previously 
obtained an order extending the time for filing the petition to 
March 2, 1989.) The petition was granted by order dated July 
12, 1989. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1989) and R. Utah S. Ct. 35. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the majority opinion give proper deference to the 
trial court's determination as to what were the critical aspects 
of plaintiff's case? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in limiting 
cross-examination of plaintiff's experts where the subject of 
the cross-examination was not a critical aspect of plaintiff's 
proof and where the defendants did not rephrase objectionable 
questions? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding 
defendants' exhibits which were not produced in response to pre-
trial discovery requests? 
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4. May this Court consider defendants1 claims of error 
with respect to the exclusion of exhibits, where the exhibits 
were not made part of the record on appeal and the relevancy and 
the materiality of the exhibits cannot be determined from the 
record? 
5. May a reversal be based upon an accumulation of 
errors, no one of which is substantial or prejudicial? 
6. In the event this Court should reverse the trial 
court, should any retrial be limited to liability only, where 
the liability and damage aspects of proof were separable and 
were actually separated at trial, and where defendants have 
claimed no error in the damage phase of the trial? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Plaintiff is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a strict liability 
product action which was tried to a jury. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Plaintiffs filed their 
original complaint on November 21, 1979. (R. 7-8.) Trial 
commenced on October 17 and continued through November 4, 1983. 
(R. 1669-1703.) The jury found the issues in favor of plain-
tiff, and a Judgment on the Verdict was entered on November 8, 
1983, awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff comprising of 
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special damages of $41,320.85, and general damages of 
$1,511,000.00 plus costs of court. (R. 1362-64.) The judgment 
remains unpaid. 
This court filed an opinion on February 2, 1989, reversing 
the judgment and jury verdict. Whitehead v. American Motors 
Sales Corporation , 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Feb. 2, 1989). 
Whitehead filed timely petition for rehearing, which was 
subsequently granted by this court. 
C. Statement of Facts. On October 16, 1979, on a clear 
afternoon, Stephen Whitehead and his wife of one year, Deborah 
Whitehead, were driving a Jeep Commando south on Interstate 15 
near Orem, Utah County, Utah. Although the vehicle was bor-
rowed, Deborah Whitehead had driven it several times before. 
Stephen Whitehead had just completed his working day and the 
couple had arranged to meet at a commuter parking area along the 
freeway. Because Deborah had prepared Stephen's dinner for him, 
she drove the vehicle while Stephen rode as a passenger in the 
right front seat. (R. 2145-2147, 2155.) 
While driving approximately 50-55 miles per hour, the 
Whitehead vehicle was struck from behind by a 1978 Oldsmobile 
driven by Larry Anderson. (R. 2147, 2151). The Oldsmobile was 
moving at a speed of approximately 65-7 0 miles per hour. The 
right front of the Oldsmobile contacted the left rear of the 
Whitehead vehicle. The Commando went out of control and rolled 
over. (R. 2151, 2152.) 
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As a result of the collision and roll-over, Deborah 
Whitehead received multiple head and limb lacerations as well as 
various bruises and abrasions. (R. 2152.) 
Stephen Whitehead was severely injured. He sustained 
injury to his spinal chord at the thoracic level of T-ll, 
(approximately four inches above the belt level), abrasions over 
his shoulders and upper portion of his back, associated tender-
ness over the left shoulder, abrasions on his hands and shins, 
and a severely broken leg (femur bone) . The injury to the 
spinal chord paralyzed Stephen Whitehead from the waist down and 
rendered him a permanent paraplegic. (R. 2254-2257.) 
Naming Larry Anderson as defendant, plaintiffs filed their 
original complaint on November 21, 1979, and through amended 
complaint, subsequently added Anderson's employer VALIC and 
AMC/Jeep. (R. 7-8, 84-87.) Trial commenced on October 17, 
1983, and a judgment was entered November 8, 1983. (R. 1362-
13 64.) The trial court denied AMC/Jeep1s Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative for a New 
Trial. (R. 1642-1644.) 
The issues on appeal relate mainly to the procedural 
history of the case, both before and during trial. The facts 
relative to those issues are set forth as part of the argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal sought appellate review of a two and one-half 
week jury trial in a complex products liability case. The trial 
court, with proper judicial vigor in the management and stream-
5 
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lining of the case, maintained strict control over the scope of 
cross-examination and the admission of evidence. Defendants now 
claim that the trial court erred in certain of its decisions. 
This Court is required to give a trial judge a wide 
latitude of discretion in the management of a complex trial. 
Cross-examination may be limited; a limitation is reversible 
only if it prejudicially limits a party's ability to challenge a 
critical aspect of the opponent's case. In reviewing the trial 
court's decision, therefore, this Court must first ascertain 
what the trial court had determined to be the critical aspects 
of the plaintiff's case and then consider whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in making that determination. Only 
then can this Court consider whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in limiting cross-examination. The majority opinion 
in this case failed to give proper deference to the trial 
court's determination that comparison with other vehicles was 
not a critical aspect of plaintiff's case. Such comparisons 
were irrelevant and inadmissible. The few comparative state-
ments which were made by plaintiff's experts were minor and 
insignificant when compared with the main thrust of plaintiff's 
case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to allow potentially confusing cross-examination into those 
areas. 
Defendants also claimed error in the exclusion of certain 
exhibits. The exhibits themselves were not made part of the 
record on appeal, and their materiality cannot be determined 
6 
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from the existing record. This alone prevents appellate review 
of their exclusion. The exhibits moreover were within the scope 
of several of plaintiff's discovery requests. The defendants1 
failures to respond to discovery had been the primary subject of 
the lengthy pre-trial proceedings in this case, and given that 
context, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the exhibits at trial. 
Even if the trial court did err in some of its rulings, 
however, the rulings did not deprive the defendants of a fair 
trial. Insubstantial and nonprejudicial errors may not be 
accumulated; the majority opinion erred in so doing in this 
case. 
Finally, and as an alternative only, in the event this 
Court determines to reverse the jury verdict, the reversal 
should be limited to liability only. No error was claimed in 
the damage aspects of the trial. Proof on damages was separate 
and distinct from the proof on liability. No just reason exists 
to allow defendants a second opportunity to contest damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
WERE WITHIN ITS DISCRETION UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
A. Introduction. 
The majority opinion's reversal is based on two primary 
claims of error. The first is that the trial court abused its 
7 
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discretion in limiting cross-examination of plaintiff's experts 
Anderson and Noettl concerning the handling characteristics of 
other vehicles. The second category of errors is the exclusion 
of three of the defense exhibits: a Heitzman film on Jeep CJ-
5's, a Heitzman film on rollovers of non-Jeep vehicles, and a 
"storyboard" (Exhibit 130) offered to illustrate Dr. Warner's 
claim that the Jeep Commando roof had been damaged in a prior 
accident. These claims of error will be addressed in order. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In 
Limiting Cross-Examination Of Plaintiff's Experts. 
The majority opinion holds that the trial court erred in 
limiting defendants1 cross-examination of plaintiff's expert 
witnesses, and asserts that defendants were "repeatedly" cut off 
during their attempts to cross-examine plaintiff's experts. 
Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep, at 29. The examples given by the 
majority opinion concern exclusively instances where the trial 
court would not allow cross-examination involving comparisons 
with other vehicles. 
As succinctly as possible, plaintiff will show that (1) the 
majority opinion fails to give proper deference to the trial 
court's determination of what were the critical aspects of 
plaintiff's proof. Any comparisons the plaintiff's experts made 
between Jeeps and other vehicles were not and could not have 
been a critical aspect of plaintiff's proof. Plaintiff will 
also show that defendants were in fact allowed extensive cross-
examination of plaintiff's experts about other vehicles. 
8 
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Defendants were not prejudiced by any rulings of the trial court 
on specific isolated questions. 
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In 
Determining That Comparison With Other Vehicles 
Was Not A Critical Aspect Of Plaintiff's Proof. 
A limitation of cross-examination may not be grounds for 
reversal unless it (1) involves a critical aspect of plaintiff's 
proof, Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, or a key issue in 
the case, id. at 29, and (2) clearly prejudices the defendant's 
ability to develop his case. State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 
(Utah 1975) . Doubts should be resolved in favor of affirming 
the trial court: 
On appeal, the cross-examination of opposing 
lawyers must be carefully scanned and every 
doubt resolved in favor of the ruling made 
by the trial court. Prejudicial error 
should not be declared unless doubt dis-
appears and the ruling of the court is 
clearly untenable. 
Joiola v. Baldridge Lumber Co., 96 N.M. 761, 635 P.2d 316, 319 
(Ct. App. 1981). 
These decisions establish that a multi-step process must be 
used in determining whether the trial court abused its discre-
tion in limiting cross-examination. First, this Court must 
ascertain what the trial court determined to be the critical 
aspects of plaintiff's case. This Court must then evaluate 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in making that 
determination. Only then may the Court consider whether the 
limitation of cross-examination prevented the defendants from 
having a fair trial. 
9 
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An examination of the record in this case reveals that a 
comparison of vehicles was not a critical aspect of plaintiff's 
proof.1 Although some of plaintiff's experts did make some 
oblique references to the handling characteristics of other 
vehicles, plaintiff's experts did not "repeatedly" draw com-
parisons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles and non-
Jeep vehicles, as contended by the majority opinion. 101 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 31. More importantly, the record does not compel 
the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in 
determining that whatever references may have been made to other 
vehicles did not constitute a critical aspect of plaintiff's 
proof. 
The majority opinion cites a few isolated examples in 
support of its claim that comparisons with other vehicles was a 
critical aspect of plaintiff's proof. Plaintiff has not been 
able to discover any comparisons with other vehicles beyond 
those cited by the majority opinion. An analysis of those few 
instances reveals that the comparisons were only incidental not 
"repeated", and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that they were not a critical aspect of plaintiff's 
proof. 
The first example given by the majority opinion of com-
parisons with other vehicles is the testimony of Mr. Anderson. 
xIndeed, evidence of the rollover propensities of other 
vehicles (industry standards) would not have been relevant or 
admissible. E.g., Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337, 
1341 (9th Cir. 1986). 
10 
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The exchange referred to in the majority opinion, 101 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 29, and quoted in the dissenting opinion, 101 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 33, is the total extent of Anderson's alleged com-
parisons of other vehicles. The critical aspect of the tes-
timony was as follows: 
Q: And what did the results show in regard 
to your tests on the Jeep itself? 
A: Well, all the results are preliminary. 
I don't have all the data reduced yet. But 
my preliminary quick look at that data 
indicates that the Jeep vehicles both 
overturn at speeds of 2 0 to 25 miles an 
hour, and they both have a delay in the 
handling response that's in the magnitude of 
a half a second before the vehicle is 
stabilized to turn. 
The other vehicles I tested, the S10 
Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, they did not 
have delays of that magnitude. They were 
much less. 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33 (R. 2676). 
The only "comparison" made in this quotation is in the 
delay in the handling response. There is no comparison of the 
speeds at which the Jeep would roll over as compared with the 
other vehicles. Mr. Anderson only testified that the Jeep 
vehicles would overturn at speeds of 2 0 to 25 miles an hour. He 
did not state how that compared with the other vehicles tested. 
The majority also held that defendants were limited in 
their cross-examination of Mr. Noettl because they were not able 
to inquire as to his experience or prove his credibility 
regarding "his testimony that it is difficult to roll a passen-
ger car." The majority opinion implies that comparison to other 
11 
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vehicles was a critical aspect of Mr. Noettl1s testimony. As 
with the testimony of Mr. Anderson, a review of the factual 
context of Mr. Noettlfs testimony demonstrates the insig-
nificance of his comment about "other vehicles" and any subse-
quent probing by AMC/Jeep. Earlier in trial, AMC/Jeepfs 
attorney, Mr. Jensen, implied that perhaps Mr. Noettl had 
performed the tests with preconceived notions as to the Jeep's 
turnover propensities, and then filmed the tests merely to 
achieve the desired effect. To rebut this implication, in re-
direct examination, the plaintiff's attorneys asked Mr. Noettl a 
question to demonstrate that he was without prior knowledge as 
to turnover propensities of a jeep as compared to any vehicle: 
Q. [by Mr. Johnson] When you started 
out with this particular test did you know 
•exactly what speeds and what input it would 
take to turn the CJ-5 over? 
A. No, absolutely. It was just the 
opposite. That the belief was that since it 
was very difficult to turn a passenger car 
over, especially on a flat surface at low 
speeds, that it would be difficult to do 
this with a Jeep, too. 
(R. 3039) 
Mr. Noettl did not say it was harder or easier to roll a 
passenger vehicle or a jeep—he simply explained that he went 
into the test open-minded. 
Finally, the majority opinion also refers to the testimony 
of Mr. Shaw as being offered to show that the Commando was 
easier to roll than other vehicles. An analysis of the testi-
mony of Mr. Shaw, who was plaintiff's first expert on the 
12 
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rollover tendencies of the Commando, illustrates that it was the 
defendants, not the plaintiff, that attempted to make com-
parisons an issue in this case. 
During an entire morning of direct examination covering 88 
pages of transcript (R. 2407-95) , Mr. Shaw made one isolated 
reference to the rollover propensities of a Commando as compared 
to other vehicles: 
Q (By Mr. Howard) All right. Now, 
do you believe there is a causal connection 
between the rollover of the Jeep and its 
handling characteristics? 
A Well, there's no doubt that this 
vehicle is much more prone to roll over than 
some others and therefore could be, is 
causal to the fact that it did roll over. 
(R. 2495.) 
The primary thrust of Mr. Shaw's testimony, however, was 
that a safe vehicle should be able to perform certain emergency 
manuevers at highway speeds (R. 2441-42), and that the Commando 
was defective because it would roll at 25 miles per hour when 
performing those emergency manuevers. (R. 2443.) The comparison 
was between the reasonably foreseeable use of the Commando and 
its performance under those conditions. No comparison with 
other vehicles was attempted. 
The defense on cross-examination, however, did inquire 
extensively into comparisons with other vehicles. (R. 2520, 
2619.) In response to the cross-examination, plaintiff did 
offer an exhibit giving the actual figures for the comparisons 
which the defense had elicited. (R. 2628.) Plaintiff had 
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previously offered a portion of the same exhibit, but had 
deleted the comparisons with other vehicles. It was only after 
the defense had inquired into the matter that the plaintiff 
offered the entire exhibit. (R. 2629.) 
These examples do not constitute "repeated" comparisons 
between Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles. Even if they did, however, 
that is not the proper test. The question is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in determining that comparisons with 
other vehicles was not a critical aspect of plaintiff's proof. 
Although members of this Court may have reached a different 
conclusion, it cannot be said that the trial court's decision 
was so wrong as to constitute an abuse of discretion. The trial 
court was in the advantaged position of being present at trial 
and had a feel for the thrust of the plaintiff's case. The main 
thrust of the plaintiff's case was that the Jeep Commando had an 
unreasonably dangerous propensity to overturn when performing 
reasonably foreseeable evasive maneuvers at highway speeds. 
Allowing detailed cross-examination into comparisons with other 
vehicles would have greatly multiplied the length and complexity 
of the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
limiting cross-examination. 
2. Any Limitation Of Cross-Examination Was Not Pre-
judicial . 
An analysis of Mr. Jensen's cross-examination proves that 
the trial court was in fact extremely generous to the defend-
ants. During the defendants' 116 page cross-examination of Mr. 
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Anderson, the plaintiff made 51 objections, only 21 were 
sustained. 
This indicates, contrary to the majority's opinion, that 
Judge Bullock gave broad latitude to the defendants to test 
Anderson's credibility. For example, approximately 40 pages 
before the exchange cited by the majority, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
29, the following examination took place: 
[Q] [By Mr. Jensen] And isn't it also a 
fact, that many vehicles, if not most 
vehicles, that are out of control and hit 
the median, roll? Roll over? 
MR. HOWARD: Objection. It's ir-
relevant and immaterial. It has no proba-
tive value. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination. He may 
answer. 
(R. 2742-43) 
Just three pages prior to the exchange cited by the 
majority, AMC/Jeep asked the following: 
Q. Now, I take it that any vehicle 
that' s on the road today can be made to 
roll, giving the right steering input, and 
speed, and environment. 
MR. HOWARD: Objection; no foundation, 
outside the scope of direct examination. 
THE COURT: He may answer. Whether 
it's appropriate or not, I have some 
question, but go ahead. 
(R. 2779) 
And just two pages before the alleged offending abuses of 
discretion the following took place: 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Well, are there 
vehicles besides Jeeps that roll over? 
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MR. HOWARD: Objection, Your Honor. 
We'll stipulate there are. 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) In driving and in 
emergency situations? 
MR. HOWARD: Objection, no foundation 
laid. 
THE COURT: It does call for a 
speculative answer. Be more specific than 
that. 
(R.2779-80) 
These represent only a few of the numerous occasions where 
the trial court allowed the defendants to push the outside of 
the envelope and go to the very boundaries of relevant cross-
examination. The trial court did not limit the defendants in 
any way, rather it simply kept the defendants from opening 
Pandora's box regarding other defective vehicles and tests of 
other vehicles. The limitation was entirely consistent with the 
law and far from an abuse of discretion. The trial court's 
rulings reflect its desire to keep the case within manageable 
proportions and consistent with its pre-trial rulings. A review 
of Mr. Anderson's testimony clearly shows that the trial court 
bent over backward to allow the defendants ample and effective 
cross-examination and that any limitation upon the defendants' 
cross-examination did not go to a critical aspect of the 
plaintiff's proof. 
A review of the testimony of Mr. Noettl similarly shows 
that the trial court did indeed allow the defense attorney to 
question Mr. Noettlfs credibility and knowledge of other 
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vehicles. Please compare the quote in the majority opinion 101 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 2 9 to that portion of the transcript where the 
trial court allowed the same type of examination complained of. 
The majority opinion states: 
In testifying for plaintiff, Mr. 
Noettl, another expert witness, testified: 
"It was very difficult to turn a passenger 
car over." On cross-examination, he was 
asked the basis of this opinion. 
Q: What experience have you had 
in trying to rollover [sic] a 
passenger vehicle? 
MR. JOHNSON: Object on the 
basis of relevancy. 
Court: I don't want to get into 
testing all other kinds of 
vehicles, because we've got enough 
problems with the one. So, I'm 
going to sustain the objection. 
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting 
opinion, it is clear that by inquiring as to 
his experience, defendants were attempting 
to probe the expert's credibility and the 
foundation for his testimony that it is 
difficult to roll a passenger car. 
Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29. 
Now compare this alleged abuse in not allowing AMC/Jeep to 
cross-examine Mr. Noettl in this area to the rest of the 
exchange. Immediately after the trial court sustained the 
objection quoted by the majority, the exchange continued: 
Q: (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to roll 
over utility vehicles? 
MR. JOHNSON: Object, without the same 
conditions. If he wants to make a point as 
it relates to similar vehicles under the 
circumstances — 
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THE COURT: Yes, I'm going to require 
that you define the question — 
MR. JENSEN: I don't know how I get 
through the credibility, Your Honor, of a 
man who says something about one vehicle and 
we can't look at anything he's done or knows 
about other vehicles. We'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to permit it, 
and subject to a motion to strike if it 
doesn't go to credibility. 
Q: (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to turn 
over, roll over, utility vehicles? 
A: Well, in my opinion the difficulty 
would be increased, would be more than the 
CJ vehicles. Probably somewhat less than a 
passenger car, though. It would be somewhat 
less difficult than a passenger car. 
Q: In the same range? 
A. As what? 
Q: As the CJ, same range of difficulty? 
A: I don't know if I understand your 
question. Maybe — 
MR. JOHNSON: I might be totally oblivious 
to it, but if this goes to credibility, I 
cannot see it. 
THE COURT: All right. You'll have your 
opportunity for a motion to strike, but you 
may proceed. 
MR. JENSEN: All right. 
Q: [by Mr. Jensen] You say it's more 
difficult to roll over some other utility 
vehicle comparing a CJ to another utility 
vehicle in its class? 
A: That would be my opinion, yes. 
Q: Have you done that? 
A: No. I have — "have you tested it"? 
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Q: Yes. 
A: No. I have not tested such things as a 
Blazer, anything like that, no. 
Q: All right. For all you know, they 
might turn over just the same as at the same 
propensity. 
A: I would bet that they would not, based 
on basic engineering principles. 
Q: What about vans? 
A: Vans, I think you'd have to explain 
that, what type of van. 
Q: You name the kind of van. 
A: You mean like a Ford Econoline, things 
of that nature? 
Q: Yes. 
A: I haven't dynamically tested them, I 
would have to measure the track width and CG 
height to give you an answer whether or not 
they were as susceptible to rollover as a 
CJ. 
Q: What about campers? 
A: Campers, again, I'd measure CG height, 
I'd measure the track width, and I've given 
you my opinion as to whether or not they 
would roll as easy as a CJ vehicle, that's 
correct. 
Q: Somebody who's had experience in 
handling vehicles and testing them would 
certainly be better equipped than you to 
tell what the actual is, as far as anyone 
can determine, when a given vehicle will 
roll or not in any given situation? 
A: Well, I don't know how to answer that 
one. 
Q: I'm talking about somebody who tests 
vehicles considerably in that regard, drives 
them and on test facilities and so forth. 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A: Again, I can't answer that question. 
All I can talk about is our tests, the 
results of our tests, as far as the roll 
threshold of being around .7 degrees has 
been used by the manufacturers to verify 
that, yes, the vehicle does indeed roll at 
that. So I don't know, they used the 
results of our tests to identify the roll 
threshold of their vehicles. 
(R. 3043-46.) 
This quotation illustrates that the trial court allowed, 
over objection, AMC/Jeep to cross-examine Mr. Noettl about all 
kinds of "other vehicles," including utility vehicles, vans and 
campers. Defendants were allowed to show that Mr. Noettl had 
not tested other vehicles, and that his testimony was not based 
on experience gained from extensive testing. 
It is respectfully submitted that there was little limit 
placed on cross-examination regarding "passenger vehicles." 
Many of the objections which the trial court sustained, as 
explained by the dissent, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35, were 
sustained based on the form of the question. Defendants waived 
any error by failing to restate the questions. 
Passenger vehicles were not an issue in the case and only 
obliquely compared by plaintiff's experts to Jeeps, and certain-
ly there is no prejudice in any limitation the trial court may 
have placed on cross-examination into that complex issue. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In 
Excluding The Heitzman Film Concerning CJ-5 Handling 
Abilities. 
The majority opinion in this case held that the trial court 
erred in excluding three of defendants' exhibits. The first 
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discussed was a video tape apparently showing CJ-5!s success-
fully negotiating emergency maneuvers. This film was offered 
through Mr. Heitzman, an expert witness called by the defendants 
to testify regarding the handling characteristics of Jeep 
vehicles. The trial court denied admission of the film. 
The trial court's ruling must be affirmed. First, the film 
was not made part of the record on appeal. Second, the film 
should have been produced in response to plaintiff's discovery 
requests, but was not. Exclusion of the film was an appropriate 
sanction. These arguments will be addressed in order. 
1. Accepted Rules Of Appellate Review Preclude This 
Court From Ruling On The Admissibility Of 
Evidence Which Was Not Made Part Of The Record On 
Appeal. 
The majority opinion concludes that the trial court 
improperly excluded a film of CJ-5 testing, a second film 
showing rollovers by non-Jeep vehicles, and Exhibit 130 (story 
board) . (Although it is not clear from the opinion or the 
underlying briefs, the undersigned counsel believes the films 
the Court was referring to are Exhibits 95 (Bootleg and Lane 
Change Film) and 96 (Pocobello Film).) These exhibits, however, 
were never before this Court for examination nor made part of 
the record on appeal. The defendants1 failure to make the 
exhibits part of the record is fatal to appellate review of any 
error in their exclusion. 
At the time they filed their notice of appeal, AMC/Jeep 
filed a designation of record which stated that the record 
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should include "all pleadings, documents, and evidence." (R. 
1661.) Whitehead argued in the initial Brief of Respondents 
Deborah Whitehead and Stephen Whitehead dated August 2, 1984 (at 
page 45) , and renews the argument here, that matters not 
admitted into evidence and not part of the record cannot be 
reviewed on appeal. Pilcher v. State, 663 P. 2d 450, 453 (Utah 
1983) (matters not admitted into evidence and not part of the 
record cannot be considered by appellate court) (citing In re 
Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128, 128 n.l (Utah 1978); Corbet v. 
Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430, 433 (1970)). Exhibits 
which were offered but not admitted are not evidence, and were 
not part of the record designated by defendants. The exhibits 
were not indexed as part of the record (R. 1712) , and were not 
included in the documents transmitted to this Court. (See R. 
1722-36.) 
The accepted rule on appeal is that it is the burden of the 
party complaining of the court's ruling to demonstrate the trial 
court's error by making the record available for consideration. 
This Court has specifically so held where the appellant failed 
to include jury instructions in the record, Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Construction Co., 701 P. 2d 1078 (Utah 1985), failed to 
include necessary transcription, Clendenen v. Western Ready Mix 
Concrete Corp., 688 P.2d 477 (Utah 1984), or failed to include 
depositions, First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. 
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). The Texas Court of 
Appeals in Roberts v. Greenstreet, 593 S.W. 2d 119 (Texas Civ. 
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App. 1979), applied this rule in the specific case of documen-
tary exhibits and held: "Without having these exhibits before 
us, we are unable to evaluate any of Appellant's points of 
error." Id. at 121. 
The Court cannot make a considered judgment concerning the 
relevance of evidence and the prejudicial effect of its ex-
clusion without having that evidence before it. Where AMC/Jeep 
did not fulfill their duty to preserve those exhibits as part of 
the record on appeal, the claims of error relating to those 
exhibits must fail. 
2. The Heitzman CJ-5 Film Was Properly Excluded For 
Defendants1 Failure To Comply With Plaintifffs 
Discovery Requests. 
The majority ruling in this case limits a trial court's 
ability to enforce this Court's repeated admonitions to the bar 
to take the high road and deal openly and fairly with the other 
side. E.g., Error v. Western Home Insurance Co., 762 P.2d 1077, 
1083 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J, concurring). 
The trial court specifically found that the defendants AMC 
and Jeep had failed to comply with discovery requests concerning 
expert materials and exhibits: 
THE COURT: I'm ready to rule. And I 
think that in the context of all of the 
circumstances in [sic] with respect to 
discovery procedures which have heretofore 
been taken in this case, I think the 
Plaintiffs were entitled to have, or to see, 
the films and test results before the trial 
pursuant to their discovery interrogatories. 
And in accordance with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and consistent with the prior 
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rulings of this Court, and another division 
of this Court, the films are not admissable. 
(R. 3353)(emphasis added)• 
It is clear from the record that AMC/Jeep were playing 
"hardball" in their approach to discovery responses. The trial 
court determined that such gamesmanship was unfair and specifi-
cally excluded AMC/Jeepfs films as a sanction for AMC/Jeep's 
failure to make proper discovery responses. The discussion 
below shows that this Court misapprehended the factual and 
procedural context of the trial court's rulings. The rulings 
were in fact correct under the circumstances. 
Plaintiffs submitted five sets of interrogatories addressed 
to American Motors Sales Corporation or Jeep Corporation, or 
both: Interrogatories, dated March 4, 1981 (R. 117-28) (Copy 
attached at Appendix "B"); Interrogatories to Defendant American 
Motors, dated September 15, 1981 (R. 238-46) (Copy attached as 
Appendix "C"); Interrogatories to Defendant Jeep Corporation, 
dated September 24, 1981 (R. 247-56) (Copy attached as Appendix 
"D") ; Interrogatories, dated August 3, 1983 (R. 907-11) (Copy 
attached as Appendix "E") ; and Interrogatories, dated August 16, 
1983 (R. 915-16). The first three sets of interrogatories, 
generally speaking, sought information concerning the design and 
development of the Jeep Commando, and also concerning any 
testing of the handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando. 
The fourth set of interrogatories, generally speaking, sought 
information concerning defendant's expert witnesses. The fifth 
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set of interrogatories sought information concerning insurance 
coverage. 
In addition, defendant Larry Anderson also submitted 
interrogatories to AMC/Jeep on April 5, 1983, which sought 
discovery of the names of all witnesses and the identification 
of all exhibits. (R. 806-08; copy attached as Appendix "F."). 
AMC/Jeep's evasive and incomplete answers to the first 
three sets of interrogatories were the subject of pretrial 
motions to compel and hearings, as is set forth in more detail 
in the initial Brief of Respondents Deborah Whitehead and 
Stephen Whitehead at pages 5-19. AMC/Jeepfs only response to 
the fourth set of interrogatories, which requested information 
concerning expert witnesses and their exhibits, was an objection 
that asserted that AMC/Jeep had no obligation beyond mere 
identification of the names of the expert witnesses. (R. 997-
99). It appears from the record that no response whatsoever was 
made to plaintiff's fifth set of interrogatories (regarding 
insurance coverage), nor to Larry Anderson's interrogatories 
regarding witnesses and exhibits. 
It is obvious that plaintiff and other parties had clearly 
sought to discover, prior to trial, the names of AMC/Jeep's 
experts and an identification of any exhibits, particularly 
those exhibits which had been relied upon by expert witnesses. 
It was nevertheless not until the middle of trial, after 
plaintiff's experts had been excused and during the presentation 
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of the defendant's evidence, that AMC/Jeep first disclosed that 
it intended to offer the Heitzman films. (R. 3345-3356.) 
In response to the trial court's inquiry as to why AMC/Jeep 
had not disclosed the existence of the films earlier (R. 3345), 
AMC/Jeep gave the following four excuses: (1) the interroga-
tories referred to tests during the development of the Commando 
only, and not to testing unrelated to the development process 
(R. 3339, 3352); (2) the tests were not performed by Jeep 
personnel, but rather by Jeep's attorneys or experts hired by 
Jeep's attorneys (R. 3341, 3346-47); (3) plaintiffs had re-
quested only information regarding testing of Commandos, and not 
other jeeps (R. 3340-41); and (4) the tests were privileged from 
pretrial disclosure as attorney work product (R. 3358). An 
example of this duplicitous gamesmanship was Mr. Mandlebaum's 
response to the trial court when asked why the films had not 
been disclosed: 
[MR. MANDLEBAUM:] It was not done by Jeep 
Corporation and I suspect that the designers 
and engineers of Jeep Corporation have never 
seen nor heard of this test. It was done at 
the request of lawyers, specifically for 
litigation. 
We raised this test earlier, Your 
Honor— 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Which 
lawyers and which litigation? 
MR. MANDLEBAUM: Which lawyers 
requested it? 
THE COURT: Yes, and which litigation? 
MR. MANDLEBAUM: It was requested by a 
law firm named JOSLIN AND TREAT, and at the 
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request of general counsel of American 
Motors Corporation. And it was done for a 
series of tests, Your Honor, series of cases 
rather. 
(R. 3341.) 
After considering the extensive arguments of counsel (R. 
3337-53) and being familiar with the entire record, the trial 
court ruled that the films were not admissible (see the quota-
tion of the ruling infra at page 23). 
The issue before this court is whether that ruling consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion under all the circumstances of the 
case. A review of each of the four excuses offered by AMC/Jeep 
for its failure to disclose the film's existence demonstrates 
that the trial court's ruling was well within its discretion. 
i. Plaintiff's Interrogatories Sought 
Disclosure of All Testing Relating to the 
Handling Characteristics of the Commando, 
Not Just Testing During the Development 
Stages. 
The first excuse offered by AMC/Jeep for not producing the 
films until the middle of trial was that plaintiff interroga-
tories only requested disclosure of testing during the develop-
ment of the Commando, and the subjects films did not relate to 
development. The interrogatories were not, however, limited to 
development tests. For example, the first set of interroga-
tories included the following: 
34. State whether American Motors Corpora-
tion ever tested for or otherwise evaluated 
the affect [sic] of the short wheel base of 
the Jeep Commando automobile on its resis-
tance to roll-over either during the 
development of said automobiles or subse-
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quent to the initial production of said 
automobiles. 
36. State whether American Motors Corpora-
tion has tested for or otherwise evaluated 
the effect of the track width of the Jeep 
Commando automobile on its resistance to 
roll-over, either during the development of 
said automobile or subsequent to the initial 
production of said automobiles. 
(R. 124.) 
The second and third sets of interrogatories were substan-
tially similar to the first set of interrogatories. While many 
of the questions did seek disclosure of development tests, the 
interrogatories also clearly sought disclosure of all subsequent 
tests of the handling characteristics of the Commando. 
ii. The Subject Films Were Produced by 
AMC/Jeepfs Agents and Were Subject to 
Discovery. 
The second excuse offered by AMC/Jeep for its apparently 
deliberate decision to not disclose the films prior to trial was 
that the films were not produced by AMC/Jeep, but rather by its 
attorneys or experts hired by its attorneys. This excuse is 
without merit. A party must, in response to a discovery 
request, disclose facts or documents in the attorney's posses-
sion even if they have not been transmitted to the party itself. 
See Hawes Firearms Co. v. Edwards, 634 P.2d 377, 379 n.4 (Alaska 
1981). The privilege further does not apply to exhibits that 
will be offered at trial. 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions and 
Discovery § 67 (1983). AMC/Jeep!s assertion of such an excuse 
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merely indicates the general posture it took towards discovery 
in this case. 
iii. The Interrogatories Encompassed Testing of 
Vehicles Similar to the Commando. 
The third excuse offered by AMC/Jeep in support of its 
nondisclosure of the films, and the one relied upon by the 
majority opinion, was that the interrogatories sought disclosure 
of tests on Commandos, whereas the films were tests of other 
vehicles. The majority's ruling was based on their reading of 
the first three sets of interrogatories. Whatever may have been 
the scope of the first three sets of interrogatories, the films 
were clearly within the scope of the fourth set of interroga-
tories. Those interrogatories sought disclosure of the names of 
AMC/Jeepfs expert witnesses* and sought the following with 
respect to each such expert: 
The name or description of the products, 
objects, documents, records, memoranda, 
correspondence, or any other tangible form 
of documentation, recordation or communica-
tion which was analyzed or examined. 
(R. 908.) 
The interrogatories further sought the following with 
respect to each such expert: 
Identify, with specificity, each and every 
document, memoranda, correspondence, record, 
or other tangible form of documentation, 
recordation, or communication which have 
been submitted to, or made available to him 
or her for purposes of forming an opinion 
relative to the issues which have been 
raised in a complaint filed in this action . 
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(R. 910.) 
The subject films were clearly a document or recordation 
which had been made available to Mr. Heitzman and analyzed by 
him. There can be no question that the films were within the 
scope of this interrogatory.2 AMC/Jeep's only response was to 
file an objection asserting that because the court had previous-
ly ordered the parties to exchange names of expert witnesses, 
AMC/Jeep had no obligation to submit any further information 
concerning those experts. (R. 997-99.) The order referred to 
(R. 949-50), however, in no way intimates that discovery was 
limited to only the names of the expert witnesses. There 
specifically is no basis in the record to conclude that AMC/Jeep 
was not under an obligation to identify its exhibits prior to 
the middle of trial. 
The subject films were, moreover, within the scope of the 
first three sets of interrogatories. The critical issue is 
whether the interrogatories may fairly be read as seeking 
disclosure of tests on non-Commando vehicles, but which related 
to the handling characteristics of the Commando. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the films 
were within the scope of the interrogatories. "Neither ques-
tions nor their answers should be interpreted with excessive 
rigidity or technicality, but a rule of reason should be applied 
2Defendant Larry Anderson also specifically requested 
disclosure of all exhibits which AMC/Jeep intended to submit at 
trial and AMC/Jeep failed to respond to the interrogatories. 
(R. 806-08.) 
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as to both." Pillincr v. General Motors Corporation, 45 F.R.D. 
366, 369 (D. Utah 1968) . This rule was illustrated in Hawes 
Firearms Co. v. Edwards, 634 P. 2d 377 (Alaska 1981). The 
defendants in that case responded negatively to an interrogatory 
which inquired: "Please state whether their is any insurance, 
either liability or otherwise, available to the Defendants to 
cover this cause of action." 63 4 P.2d at 3 79. The defendants 
negative answer was probably technically correct. The manufac-
turer of the product in question in that case, however, had 
agreed to indemnify the defendant and an insurance company had 
insured the indemnity agreement. The Alaska Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the defendant had 
willfully failed to comply with discovery and affirmed the order 
striking the defendant's answer. 
A similar result was reached in United Nuclear Corp. v. 
General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980). One of 
the interrogatories in question in that case sought discovery of 
certain information from the defendants, but failed to specifi-
cally state that it also sought the information from a cartel of 
which the defendant was a member. The defendant failed to 
disclose the requested information relating to the cartel. 
Based on that and other discovery abuses, the trial court 
entered default judgment against the defendant. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated as follows: 
In construing Rules 33 and 34, we must begin 
with the notion that discovery is designed to 
"make a trial less a game of blindman's buff and 
more a fair contest with the basic issues and 
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facts disclosed to the fullest practicable 
extent.11 United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 
U.S. 677, 682, 78 S.Ct. 983, 986-87, 2 L.Ed.2d 
1077 (1958) (citation omitted). In light of that 
policy, Rules 53 and 34 must be liberally 
construed in order to ensure that a litigant's 
right to discovery is "broad and flexible." 
[citations omitted.] 
629 P.2d at 245-46. 
Addressing the specific interrogatory in question, the 
Court held as follows: 
The second of the excuses—the failure 
of the complaint or interrogatories to 
explicitly or implicitly mention the cartel 
.-.. is immaterial. United's right to informa-
tion did not turn upon its discovery of a 
magic formula. 
629 P.2d at 290. 
The interrogatories in the instant case, fairly read in 
light of the foregoing principals, inquired as to any test 
performed by AMC/Jeep, or its agents or attorneys, at any time, 
which evaluated or would be used at trial to evaluate the 
handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando. The interroga-
tories were not limited to "tests of the Commando," but rather 
encompassed tests of the handling characteristics of the 
Commando. 
For example, interrogatory no. 3 6 of the first set of 
interrogatories inquired as to whether "American Motors Corpora-
tion has tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the 
track width of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to 
roll-over . . . ." (R. 124, copy attached at Appendix "B".) 
The track width of the Commando was identical to the track width 
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of the CJ-5 which was shown in the Heitzman films, (R. 2962.) 
The Heitzman film constituted a test of the effect of a track 
width of the Jeep Commando on its resistance to roll-over and 
was offered at trial as such. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that the test was within the scope of 
the interrogatories. 
The majority opinion apparently asserts, however, that the 
defendants had no advance notice of a comparison between the 
wheel bases of the CJ-5 and the Commando, and that reading the 
interrogatory to include the Heitzman film would be unfair.3 In 
overturning the trial court on this issue, this Court stated: 
The dissenting opinion would have defendants 
divine the scope of the requests by a trial 
court ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence which came much later. This burden 
cannot fairly be placed on them. 
Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. 
Contrary to this Court's opinion, the defendants were not 
required to divine that filmed testing of CJ-5's, which was the 
subject of Exhibit 95, was going to be an issue at trial and 
within the scope of discovery. Plaintiff had specifically 
3It is important to remember that the Heitzman films were, 
in any event, within the scope of the fourth set of interroga-
tories and Larry Anderson's interrogatories. AMC/Jeep under-
stood the films to be within the scope of those interrogatories. 
In discussing the Heitzman films, Mr. Mandlebaum, AMC/Jeep's 
attorney, stated that "[i]t wasn't requested until interroga-
tories, your honor." (R. 3343.) This implicit acknowledgement 
that disclosure of the films had been requested, coupled with 
Jeep's nondisclosure until the middle of trial, constitutes an 
independent basis for the trial court's exclusion of the films. 
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advised defendants of his intention to use such filmed testing 
as shown below in this subpoint. 
In addition, even if defendants could have claimed ig-
norance at the early stages of this lawsuit, plaintiff submitted 
an additional set of interrogatories after the set discussed in 
the majority opinion. As is shown above at page 2 6 of this 
Brief, the excluded films were clearly within the scope of at 
least the fourth set of interrogatories, yet AMC/Jeep did not 
disclose the films. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine filed ap-
proximately two weeks before trial addressed this deficiency. 
Even at the hearing on the motion the defendants did not 
disclose the film, presumably on the theory that it was the work 
product of counsel, and therefore immune from the order of the 
court. The judge took the motion under advisement and said he 
would rule as the evidence was offered. No disclosure was made 
by the defendants until the film was marked and offered. 
The following excerpts from the deposition of plaintiff's 
expert, Robert Anderson, taken in July, 1983, illustrate that 
defendants knew that filmed testing of CJ-5's and CJ-7fs was 
going to be an issue at trial: 
Q: (By Mr. Jensen) Now, you say it's 
susceptible to overturn? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you say that's a defect in 
this vehicle? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Have you ever overturned a 
Commando? 
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A: Not a Commando, no. 
Q: Then what do you base that opinion 
on? What experience do you have? 
A: I base that on the testing that 
I've done of similar vehicles. 
Q: What similar vehicles? 
A: The CJ 5 and the CJ 7 are similar 
vehicles. The basic difference between the 
CJ 5 and the CJ 7 and the Commando, is the 
wheel base. The center of gravity is 
basically the same, and the width of the 
vehicle is basically the same. And those 
are the two parameters that are most 
important in governing the overturn of the 
vehicle. 
Q: So you are saying that the CJ 5 
and 7 is similar to a CJ 6? 
A: The Commando, yes. 
(R. 1750 at pp. 18-19.) 
* * * 
Q: [By Mr. Jensen] 
with you in these tests? 
Who participated 
A: They were done by me. Dynamic 
Science supported me. They furnished a 
driver and photographer and the test track. 
And I also had some help measuring the 
center of gravity on some of these vehicles, 
from a guy by the name of Morrie Shaw. But 
I basically did all the tests. 
Q: These are documented in a film? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Is that available for us to look 
at! 
A: Well, the testing was funded by an 
attorney in Reno, Nevada. 
Q: What's his name? 
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A: Peter Chase Neumann. And he has 
possession of all the films. 
Q: And those eight vehicles, one of 
them was a CJ 7, 1980? 
A: Yes. 
(R. 1750 at pp. 21-22.) 
* * * 
Q: (BY MR. JENSEN) So what conclu-
sions did you draw from that test, with 
respect to the 1972 Commando that's involved 
in this case? 
A: Well, that has basically the same 
height-to-width ratio as the CJ 5 and CJ 7. 
Therefore, it has a similar susceptibility 
to overturn in a steering maneuver as the CJ 
5 and the CJ 7. 
(R. 1750 at p. 26.) 
It is clear from the record that AMC/Jeep knew well in 
advance of trial that a significant aspect of their defense 
would involve rebuttal to plaintiff's evidence concerning the 
comparability of CJ-5 testing. Despite full knowledge of the 
issues, AMC/Jeep elected to withhold from plaintiff their 
evidence concerning CJ-5 testing and testing of other vehicles 
for comparison of rollover susceptibility. 
The defendants were not surprised, rather they were guilty 
of the worst kind of discovery abuse. This Court's suggestion 
that defendants were burdened by the trial court with a duty of 
divination is not substantiated anywhere in the record. 
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iv. The Claim of "Work Product" was not a Valid 
Excuse for Failing to Disclose the Heitzman 
Films. 
AMC/Jeepfs final excuse for failing to disclose the 
Heitzman films was that they were work product. Whitehead 
respectfully asserts that the films clearly were not work 
product. Even if they were, AMC/Jeep still had a duty to 
disclose their existence. Pilling v. General Motors 
Corporation, 45 F.R.D. 366, 369-70 (D. Utah 1968). Particularly 
with matter which will be introduced as exhibits at trial, a 
party has a duty to at least disclose the existence of the 
exhibits and enough of the contents so that the opposing party 
can determine if the claim of work product is legitimate. 
AMC/Jeep!s failure to do so constituted an abuse of discovery 
which warranted the sanction imposed by the trial court. 
D. Exclusion Of The Heitzman Film On Non-Jeep Rollovers 
Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion. 
The second Heitzman film was not admitted for all the 
reasons referred to above concerning discovery and because it 
was determined to be irrelevant. A considered evaluation of the 
relevancy of that film cannot be made because the film is not 
part of a record on appeal. While the film is not in the 
record, it is counsel's recollection that the second film was 
made by Ford Motor Company and showed Ford automobiles, with 
facsimiles (dummies) of human bodies, being driven off ramps so 
as to turn over. There was simply no relevance to the film 
except to show that under laboratory conditions other passenger 
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car vehicles, not utility vehicles, could be turned over. (R. 
3353.) 
The trial court had at least three clear bases for ex-
cluding the films: (1) discovery abuse, including the failure 
to respond to plaintiff's third set of interrogatories, which 
was not considered by this Court, (2) an improper claim of work 
product, and the failure to disclose that claim prior to trial 
and (3) irrelevancy of the second film. Viewed in the context 
of the entire case, each of the trial court's rulings was within 
the permissible scope of discretion, and should be affirmed. 
E. Refusal to Admit Exhibit 130 (Illustrative Story 
Board) Was Not Error. 
AMC/Jeep through Dr. Charles Warner offered and the court 
received 34 exhibits. Only two exhibits prepared by Dr. Warner 
were excluded and a basis for a defense claim of error. Exhibit 
174, a film made on a Saturday during a weekend recess in the 
middle of Warner's testimony, was found inadmissible by this 
Court because it had no probative value and had been barred by 
the ruling of Judge Sorenson which excluded this evidence for 
failure to respond to discovery. The only other exhibit refused 
by the trial court was Exhibit 13 0. The entire testimony 
regarding this exhibit is set forth as follows: 
Q. All Right. I ask you what Exhibit 
130 is. 
A. 130 is a story board, notes that I 
have prepared that show the various 
measurements and the other indications of 
damage on this vehicle. 
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MR. JENSEN: We offer 130, Your 
Honor. 
MR. HOWARD: May I voir dire the 
witness? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOWARD: 
Q. Dr. Warner, didn't you say as one 
of the last remarks that you made on Friday 
evening, that you were not sure there was 
any—let me restate it. You said two 
things. One, that you did not think the 
Jeep was defective at the time of the 
accident. 
A. At the time it left the hands of 
the manufacturer I said. 
Q. And is it not true, that you also 
said that at the time of the accident you're 
not sure there was any defect in the Jeep? 
A. No defect that I could see that 
necessarily caused the accident. 
Q. Yes. That's what I thought you 
said. 
A. That's right. 
MR. HOWARD: Okay. 
MR. JENSEN: Offer 130, your Honor. 
MR. HOWARD: My objection, Your Honor, 
is that we concede that there had been an 
accident in the Jeep, and there'd been some 
repairs. But unless there's a defect that 
caused the accident, it's irrelevant and 
immaterial. No one contends that there's a 
substantial modification or substantial 
change in the condition of the vehicle that 
caused the accident. And therefore, all of 
this data concerning body putty, things of 
that sort, that normally go into a vehicle 
after a repair, isn't material. 
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MR. JENSEN: Offer it, Your Honor. 
Stand on the record. We've gone into the 
whole explanation of the condition. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. 
(R. 3812-14) 
The record states that Exhibit 130 was a series of Dr. 
Warner's notes. No further explanation was given. The failure 
to produce this exhibit violated the discovery rulings of the 
trial court, and was further inadmissible for lack of adequate 
foundation and probative value. A simple reading of the above 
colloquy clearly demonstrates that the exhibit, even if 
admissible, was not substantial evidence whose refusal would be 
prejudicial. 
Furthermore the transcript does not adequately explain what 
Dr. Warner meant by a "story board" and the exhibit itself was 
not seen or reviewed by this Court or furnished by AMC/Jeep to 
this Court. It appears that the exhibit was merely illustrative 
of testimony which had been previously admitted. It seems 
impossible for the majority of the Court to have reached its 
conclusion regarding the admissibility of this Exhibit 130 
without viewing the exhibit. It was the defendants1 burden to 
designate that exhibit as part of the record on appeal and to 
have it presented to this Court. It was error for this Court to 
reverse based on the exclusion of an exhibit the relevance of 
which cannot be determined from the record. 
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POINT III 
THE MAJORITY OPINION IMPROPERLY ACCUMULATES 
INSUBSTANTIAL AND NONPREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The majority opinion in effect adopts a "cumulative error 
doctrine" and overrules, sub silentio, prior decisions of this 
Court. The majority opinion, after analyzing the few isolated 
errors which AMC/Jeep was able to claim existed in the record of 
the three-week trial, states as follows: 
In the instant case, the trial court er-
roneously " excluded evidence offered by 
defendants. That evidence was necessary to 
rebut the assertions that plaintiffs made to 
establish liability. This error was 
compounded by unduly restricting the scope 
of defendants1 cross-examination. Given the 
conflicting testimony presented on this key 
issue, we cannot say that the substantial 
rights of defendants were not affected by 
the combined effects of the erroneous 
exclusion of the evidence and the limitation 
of cross-examination. While no one error by 
itself perhaps mandates reversal, the 
cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines our confidence that defendants 
were able to present to the jury their 
theory of the case and that a fair trial was 
had. 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 
32 (Feb. 2, 1989)(emphasis added). 
The Court, by such language, has created a new category of 
error somewhere between "prejudicial" and "non-prejudicial" in 
which a single "nearly prejudicial" error does not mandate 
reversal, but four "nearly prejudicial" errors do. It is not 
clear, under this new standard, whether one gauges the cumula-
tive effect by the length of the trial, the timing of the error 
41 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in regard to other errors, or by some other criteria, e.g., one 
non-prejudicial error per 1000 pages of transcript. 
This Court has previously held that error, in order to 
warrant reversal, must be "substantial and prejudicial." Lamb 
v. Bancrart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974). See also State v. 
Miller, 727 P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 
(Utah 1985) ; Terry v. Zion's Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 
314 (Utah 1979). Any single "substantial and prejudicial" error 
is alone sufficient to necessitate reversal. If, however, an 
error is not "substantial and prejudicial," it does not justify 
reversal. 
The same principle was expressed in a civil case by an Ohio 
appellate court as follows: 
It is argued that even though this 
court should find that no single error 
assigned was sufficiently prejudicial to 
justify a reversal of the judgment, yet the 
accumulative effect of all of the errors set 
out, when taken together, requires this 
court to hold that the plaintiff was not 
afforded a fair trial and that for that 
reason, the judgment should be reversed and 
a new trial granted. This claim is without 
any legal foundation whatever. Any error 
shown upon the record must stand or fall on 
its own merits and is not aided by the 
accumulative effect of other claims of 
error. 
Nicholas v. Yellow Cab Co. , 116 Ohio App. 402, 180 N.E.2d 279, 
286 (1962)(emphasis added). See also Richlin v. Gooding 
Amusement Co. , 113 Ohio App- 99, 170 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1960), 
appeal dismissed, 172 Ohio St. 342, 175 N.E.2d 516 (1961); Hess 
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Oil & Chemical Corp. v. Nash, 226 Ga. 706, 177 S.E.2d 70, 72-73 
(1970). 
The logic for this rule is clear. Zero plus zero plus zero 
still equals zero. The need for the rule is also clear, as was 
stated in a prior decision of this Court: 
This court has previously stated that in any 
lawsuit of several days duration counsel can 
usually find matters upon which he may claim 
error, but this court will not reverse on 
mere error but only if it be substantial and 
prejudicial to the extent that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that unfairness or 
injustice has resulted. 
Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974). 
Counsel for Whitehead are aware of only two prior Utah 
cases which have applied any type of cumulative error doctrine. 
Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959); State v. 
St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955). Plaintiff 
respectfully submits that neither of those cases provides 
support for the cumulative error rationale of the majority 
opinion in this case. 
State v. St. Clair was an appeal from a conviction of first 
degree murder and a sentence of death. As stated in the opinion 
itself, the appellate court had a heightened duty of scrutiny 
due to the severity of the penalty imposed. 282 P. 2d at 332. 
That circumstance is not present in this civil case. St. Clair 
has never been cited by any court as support for a cumulative 
error doctrine. 
Ivie v. Richardson can best be explained by this Court's 
own subsequent citations to that opinion. The portion of the 
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opinion quoted by AMC/Jeep has been frequently cited by the Utah 
Supreme Court, but never as supporting a cumulative error i 
doctrine. For example, Ivie was cited in State v. Geurts, 11 
Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12, 16 (1961), as support for the state-
ment that an error is not reversible "unless it is of such i 
consequence that it is may fairly be supposed that it had a 
substantial effect upon the trial in that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that a different result would have obtained, absent i 
such error." In Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003, 
1005 (1966) , Ivie was cited to support the statement that 
"[r]eversal of a judgment is justified only when there is some i 
error of such a substantial nature that there is a likelihood 
that the result would have been different in its absence." 
in addition, an analysis of Ivie itself demonstrates that i 
the errors identified in that case were each independently 
substantial and prejudicial. Two of the jury instructions 
regarding contributory negligence, the primary issue in the 1 
case, were conflicting with each other. Another jury instruc-
tion contained an erroneous statement of law. The errors were 
clearly prejudicial. 1 
Even the best trial judges are bound to make some errors. 
The longer the trial, the greater the number of errors. If the 
"cumulative error" logic of the majority opinion is allowed to ' 
stand, a reversal can be assured for any protracted trial. This 
would cripple the judicial process. The trial judge, who is on 
the front line and intimately familiar with the trial, must be { 
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granted a wide latitude of discretion in evidentiary rulings. 
This is especially true for long trials. 
This Court correctly concluded that none of the errors by 
itself justified reversal. Because no single error was substan-
tial or prejudicial, the judgment of the trial court in this 
case should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED 
FOR A NEW TRIAL ON LIABILITY ONLY, AND 
THE DAMAGE AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Nowhere among its numerous and comprehensive claims of 
error does AMC/Jeep challenge the jury's verdict as to the 
amount necessary to compensate Stephen Whitehead for his severe 
and tragic injuries. The jury verdict is, if anything, too 
little. Appellee has established herein that the judgment of 
the trial court should be affirmed in its entirety. Assuming, 
arguendo, that this Court does not modify its decision and 
affirm the trial court, any new trial should be limited to the 
issue of liability only, and the judgment on damages should be 
held in abeyance and execution thereon stayed pending the 
outcome of the new trial. 
This Court has previously acknowledged the prejudicial 
effect of a grant of a new trial: 
A second trial is not without its costs 
in terms of scarce litigant and judicial 
resources and the possible unavailability of 
witnesses or the erosion of their memories. 
Consequently, the trial judge's prerogative 
to grant a new trial on an evidentiary basis 
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under Rule 59(a)(6) should be exercised with 
forbearance. 
Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982). 
A corollary to this rule is that a new trial should not be 
ordered on issues as to which there was no error: 
i 
The guiding principle is that although a 
verdict ought not to stand which is tainted 
with illegality, there ought to be- but one 
fair trial upon any issue, and that parties 
ought not to be compelled to try anew a 
question once disposed of by a decision < 
against which no illegality can be shown. 
58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 25 (1971). 
This Court has stated that a new trial as to liability only 
would be proper unless the liability and damage issues are "so 
intermingled that fairness to both parties requires retrial on 
both." Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 598, 607 n.ll (Utah 1983). 
See also Annot., Grant of new trial on issue of liability alone, 
without retrial of issue of damages, 34 A.L.R.2d 988 (1954). 
There is no question that the issues of liability and 
i 
damages were not intermingled in this case. Prior to the trial, 
plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine to Bifurcate Testimony (R. 
1053), which sought to bifurcate the testimony on liability from 
that on damages. The defendants did not file any written 
response to the motion, but did argue against the motion. The 
logical basis or legal authority for the defendants1 opposition 
is not clear from the record. (R. 1671, 4820.) After consider-
ing all of the arguments, the trial court granted the plain-
tiff's motion to bifurcate the testimony on liability from that 
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on damages. The defendants have not questioned the propriety of 
that ruling. 
In addition to affirming the jury verdict as to the amount 
of Stephen Whitehead's damages, this Court should also specifi-
cally hold that interest will continue to accrue on that damage 
award. Utah has long recognized that a party who delays 
compensating an injured person should pay interest to compensate 
for the delay: 
Interest by way of damages, or moratory 
interest, as it is sometimes called, is 
interest allowed in actions for breach of 
contract or in actions for tort as damages, 
for the unlawful detention of money found to 
be due. It depends not upon any express 
contractual obligation to pay interest, but 
upon the theory that the party breaching the 
contract or committing the tort became bound 
at the time of the breach to make repara-
tion; and for this delay in making such 
reparation, the injured party is entitled to 
such interest, as will recompense him 
therefor. 
Farnworth v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571, 575> 
(1950)(quoting 30 Am. Jur. Damages § 2 ) . 
Although prejudgment interest is generally not allowed on 
the general damage portion of a personal injury award, the 
rationale for this rule is that the debt is unliquidated. 22 
Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 667 (1988) . Interest is allowed "where 
the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the 
loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy.11 Jorgensen 
v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983). 
Where the amount of Stephen Whitehead's loss has been fixed 
by a jury, no reason exists to deny him interest on that entire 
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sum during the time that defendants have the use of that money. 
This Court should so hold. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The rules of this Court provide that the Court has discre-
tion to schedule additional oral arguments in this case. R. 
Utah Sup. Ct. 35(c). Plaintiff respectfully submits that this 
is an appropriate case to rehear oral arguments. 
Although the Court has power in some cases to decide cases 
on the briefs without receiving oral arguments, plaintiff 
respectfully urges the Court to not do so in this case. Oral 
argument is important, particularly where several issues are 
involved. Numerous studies have considered the effect and 
importance of oral argument. Several of the studies were 
summarized by the California Supreme Court as follows: 
Oral argument provides the only opportunity for a 
dialogue between the litigant and the bench. As 
result, "it promotes understanding in ways that 
cannot be matched by written communication.If 
[Citation.] For example, in complex cases, oral 
argument "provides a fluid and rapidly moving 
method of getting at essential issues. [Cita-
tion.] In the words of one judge, tf 'Mistakes, 
errors, fallacies and flaws elude us in spite of 
ourselves unless the case is pounded and hammered 
at the Bar. f ff [Citation.] 
Moles v. Regents of the University of California, 32 Cal. 3d 
867, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 654 P.2d 740, 743-44 (1982) (emphasis 
added). 
In another study, two federal appellate court judges 
evaluated the effects of oral argument on their own decisions, 
and stated as follows: 
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As caseloads increase, oral argument 
becomes even more important to decision 
making. All too often, with the time 
pressures that accompany heavy work loads, 
essential elements of a case are overlooked 
in a hurried reading and analysis of the 
briefs. In many cases, effective oral 
argument thus lessens the likelihood of an 
erroneous decision. 
Bright and Arnold, Oral Argument? It May Be Crucial!, 70 A.B.A. 
J. 68, 69 (Sept. 1984). 
The trial in this case took two and one-half weeks, and the 
record is over 5,000 pages. In a case such as this, oral 
arguments would be helpful to allow the litigants an opportunity 
to clarify any questions the Court might have. 
CONCLUSION 
This case was tried before one of the State's most capable 
trial judges. The majority opinion failed to give proper 
deference to the trial court's discretion in evidentiary 
rulings. In doing so, this Court relied on evidence which was 
not part of the record, and which did not relate to a critical 
aspect of plaintiff's case. The judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
As an alternative, and only as an alternative, this case 
should be remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability 
only. 
DATED this 4L'^ day of August, 1989. 
(/HOW 
(CKSON HOWARD, f o r : 
I0 ARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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CODE•CO 
Provo, Utah 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp. 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 27 
was merely incidental that he chose to make 
them from his home. 
We hold that the "coming and going rule" is 
applicable in cases involving third-party 
negligence claims. Where a third party is 
seeking to hold an employer vicariously liable, 
the employee must be in the "course and scope 
of his employment," that is, he must be acting 
to benefit his employer and subject to his 
control. The trial court erred in ruling that 
Anderson was in the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident as a 
matter of law. The order directing a verdict in 
favor of plaintiffs and Anderson is reversed, 
and the case is remanded to enter judgment in 
favor of VALIC in accordance with the jury 
verdict. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
1. AMC/Jeep. was held liable for the remaining 70 
percent because of the negligent design of the 1972 
Jeep Commando in which plaintiffs were riding. 
AMC/Jeep has filed a separate appeal, No. 19695, 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, which we also decide today. 
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendants American Motors Sales Corpo-
ration and Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep) 
appeal a judgment awarded plaintiff Stephen 
Whitehead on a products liability-claim. 
On October 16, 1979, Deborah Whitehead 
was driving south on 1-15 near Orem, Utah, 
in a 1972 Jeep Commando that she had bor-
rowed from her father. Her husband, Stephen, 
was riding in the passenger seat. Defendant 
Larry Anderson was returning home from 
work in his automobile, a short distance 
behind the Whiteheads. The Oldsmobile 
station wagon he was driving was traveling 
approximately fifteen miles per hour faster 
than the Commando. The Oldsmobile struck 
the Commando on the left rear corner; the 
Commando went out of control and rolled. 
Stephen Whitehead suffered a spinal injury 
and was rendered a paraplegic. 
Plaintiffs Deborah and Stephen Whitehead 
filed their original complaint on November 21, 
1979, naming Anderson as defendant. The 
complaint was later amended, adding Ande-
rson's employer, Variable Annuity Life Ins-
urance Company,1 and AMC and Jeep as 
defendants. 
During the nearly four years between the 
filing of the original complaint and the begi-
nning of trial, the parties engaged in extensive 
discovery. Plaintiffs propounded three sets of 
interrogatories to AMC/Jeep. Their failure to 
timely answer the interrogatories brought 
motions by plaintiffs to compel discovery. 
AMC/Jeep's answers, when received, pro-
mpted a motion to strike as unresponsive and 
additional motions to compel discovery by 
plaintiffs. A hearing on those motions was 
held on October 29, 1982, where Judge Sore-
nsen2 went through the interrogatories and 
answers. He modified some of the questions, 
gave orders for supplemental answers to be 
given, and stated that if the answers stood as 
given, he would sustain objections to evidence 
not conforming with the answers. Plaintiffs 
orally asked for sanctions against AMC/Jeep 
for failure to cooperate in discovery. While no 
formal motion was made and no order for 
sanctions was ever issued, plaintiffs did file a 
motion in limine after the supplemental 
answers were filed seeking to prohibit AMC/ 
Jeep from introducing evidence pertaining to 
the subjects of certain interrogatories. The 
court reserved ruling on the motion until the 
evidence was offered. 
Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine on 
October 7, 1983, regarding the admissibility of 
a film produced by Dynamic Science that 
showed Jeep CJ-5s rolling over in staged 
tests. Upon a prescreeninng of the film and 
over AMC/Jeep's objection, the judge ruled 
that the film was admissible. Plaintiffs also 
moved to exclude all evidence as to the avail-
ability and their nonuse of seat belts. After 
reviewing memoranda of the parties and pro-
ffers of proof, the court barred references to 
the availability or nonuse of seat belts. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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American Motors Sales Corporation filed its 
answer to the complaint in September 1983, j 
over three years after being named in the 
amended complaint and just one month prior i 
to the trial. It raised Utah Code Ann. §78- I 
15-3(1) (1987) as a defense. This statute bars 
the bringing of a products liability action 
"more than six years after the date of initial 
purchase for use or consumption." Jeep Cor-
poration moved to amend its answer to also 
include this defense; the motion was denied. 
Trial commenced on October 19, 1983, and 
continued for three weeks. The jury determ-
ined that AMC and Jeep were negligent in the 
design of the vehicle and awarded damages to 
Stephen Whitehead. AMC and Jeep appeal, 
raising several issues which we will separately 
consider. 
I. 
Defendants contend that they should have 
been allowed to interpose a defense based on 
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3 (1987), which 
provides that product liability actions are 
barred if brought "more than six years after 
the initial purchase." In Berry ex rel Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), we 
held that statute to be unconstitutional; ther-
efore, defendants' point is moot. 
DL 
Defendants contend that the court erred in 
admitting plaintiffs' films of Jeep CJ-5s. In 
reviewing questions of admissibility of evid-
ence at trial, deference is given^ to the trial 
court's advantageous position;* thus, that 
court's rulings regarding admissibility will not 
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
Bullock v. Ungrichu 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 
1975); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Collins v. 
B.F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 
1977). 
The criteria for establishing the admissibility 
of crash test films, such as those in issue here, 
'are that the data be relevant, that the tests be 
conducted under conditions substantially 
similar to those of the actual occurrence, and 
that its presentation not consume undue 
amounts of time, not confuse the issues, and 
not mislead the jury. Endicott v. Nissan 
Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal. 
Rptr. 95 (1977); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. 
Rptr. 110 (1973); Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 
F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1981); Renfro Hosiery 
Mills Co. v. United Cash Register Co., 552 
F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); see Weaver v. Ford 
Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D. Pa. 
1974), afrd, 515 F.2d 506, 507 (3d Cir. 1975) j 
(without published opinion); see also Collins 
v. B.F. Goodrich, 558 F.2d at 910. 
Defendants objected to admission of tests of 
CJ-5s on the basis that the CJ-5 has a 20-
inch shorter wheelbase, giving it different 
i Motors Sales Corp, CODE • co 
v. Rep. 27
 z Prove Utah 
steering and handling characteristics than the 
Commando. Defendant also objected on 
grounds that the tests were not substantially 
similar to the accident conditions. The tests 
were "J turns" where 588 degrees of steering 
were suddenly input while a constant vehicle 
speed was maintained. The test vehicles had 
also been "specially prepared" to accentuate 
the rollovers depicted in the films. The requi-
rement of "substantial similarity of condit-
ions" does not require absolute identity; 
however, they must "be so nearly the same in 
substantial particulars as to afford a fair 
comparison in respect to the particular issue to 
which the test is directed/ Illinois Central 
GulfR.R. v. Ishee, 317 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss. 
1975) (emphasis added). The films here were 
offered to show the handling characteristics of 
the Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs' experts test-
ified at length that the handling characteristics 
of the CJ-5s shown in the tests and the 
Commando were substantially similar. Defe-
ndants by cross-examination and presenta-
tion of their own evidence endeavored to bring 
out the differences between the test and the 
accident and between the vehicle tested and 
the vehicle in question. 
Given our .standard of review of the admi-
ssibility of evidence at trial, we cannot clearly 
say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting ,. plaintiffs' films in light of the 
foundation laid'by their experts. As the trial 
court stated in admitting the films, any diffe-
rences between the tests and the accident here 
would go to the weight the jury would give the 
evidence.* Jones v. Stemco Mfg. Co., 624 P.2d 
1044, 1046 (Okla. 1981); see Lopez v. Allen, 
96 Idaho 866, 871, 538 P.2d 1170, 1175 
(1975). ~. 
m. 
Defendants next contend that the trial court 
erred in limiting their cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. While unduly 
harsh limitation of a key expert witness can 
amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope 
of cross-examination is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and should not be 
disturbed absent a showing of abuse. State v. 
Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978); Stare v. 
Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 
(1972); State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d 
987 (1969); N.V. Maatschappij v. A.O. Smith 
Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1978). In 
Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 
(Wyo. 1978), the Wyoming court held that it 
was prejudical error to refuse to allow cross-
examination regarding a critical aspect of 
plaintiffs proof. There the court stated: 
Having offered his expert opinion, 
the witness exposes himself to int-
errogation which ordinarily would 
have no place in the cross-
examination of a factual witness, 
Whitehead v. America 
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but the expert exposes himself to 
the most searching kind of investi-
gation into his qualifications, the 
extent of his knowledge and the 
reasons for his opinion, including 
the facts and other matters upon 
which it is based. 
Id. at 1133. 
Defendants contend that there were several 
instances where the trial court's limiting of 
cross-examination prevented them from 
examining the basis of opinions offered by 
plaintiffs' experts. In his direct testimony, 
-plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Anderson, testified that 
the Jeep Commando was defective because its 
track width was narrow and its center of 
gravity high, making it easily susceptible to 
rollovers. He also testified concerning the 
handling characteristics of Blazers, Chevy 
C h e v e t t e s , and C J - 7 s . On c r o s s -
examination, he was asked: 
Q: Are there other vehicles that 
1
 have the same track width? 
Mr. Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]: 
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained on. the grounds 
;_..-' it's irrelevant. 
£ • Q: Are there other vehicles that 
^ have about the same center of 
^ gravity? / * _ : 
';;• Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrel-
"~v- evant. .•'" J .:- . , \ . ,•''•• . '*-1 
"5* Court: Sustained! c 
Q: If you drive a three-quarter-
ton pickup, is it the same, as driving 
a Honda Accord; handling, stee-
ring? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrel-
evant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: ... [T]ake another vehicle that 
has wider track width, and lower 
center of gravity, can it be rolled on 
;: a level surface with driver [steering] 
?i '... input? 
«* Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrel- . 
?tstr. evant. 
i ^ ' h - . . . 
• Court: Sustained. 
Defendants contend that not allowing them to 
cross-examine Anderson with regard to 
-characteristics of other vehicles and how they 
would react under the conditions depicted in 
plaintiffs' film left unchallenged the assertions 
that track width and center of gravity are the 
essential characteristics in determining a 
vehicle's rollover susceptibility and that Jeeps 
are more dangerous than "other vehicles" 
because their track width is narrower and their 
center of gravity higher. Mr. Anderson had 
been ailowed to compare Jeeps with other 
vehicles, including the Chevy Chevette, which, 
contrary to the thesis of the dissenting 
opinion, is not a utility vehicle. Defendant 
should have been allowed to probe the com-
parisons Anderson made. 
In testifying for plaintiff, Mr. Noettl, 
another expert witness, testified: "It was very 
difficult to turn a passenger car over." On 
cross-examination, he was asked the basis of 
this opinion. 
Q: What experience have you had 
in trying to rollover [sic] a passe- ' 
nger vehicle? 
Mr. Johnson: Object on the basis 
of relevancy. 
Court: I don't want to get into 
testing all other kinds of vehicles, 
because we've got enough problems 
with the one. So, I'm going to 
sustain the objection. 
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting 
opinion, it is clear that by inquiring as to his 
experience, defendants were attempting to 
probe the expert's credibility and the found-
ation for his testimony that it is difficult to 
roll a passenger car. 
On recross-examination, Mr. Noettl was 
also asked: 
Q: I think we were talking about 
what you would expect to happen 
to the Commando or any other 
vehicle that's hit under the circu-
mstances you have been describing. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And do you feel that any 
vehicle would come out of that sit-
uation unscathed, basically? 
Plaintiffs objection to this question was also 
sustained. 
An assertion or opinion given on direct 
testimony that bears on a key issue in the case 
is a proper subject of cross-examination. 
While the trial court's attempt to avoid con-
fusion of the issues and a long and cumber-
some trial is understandable, defendants were 
entitled to conduct cross-examination into 
the basis of the opinions offered by plaintiffs' 
expert witnesses and to probe the comparisons 
they had made on direct examination. -
Here defendants were repeatedly cut off 
during their attempts to cross-examine plai-
ntiffs' experts. The numerous objections of 
plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were imp-
roperly sustained, prevented defendants from 
probing the basis of opinions given by plain-
tiffs' experts on comparisons they had made 
in their direct examination. As a result, the 
issues were presented to the jury without the 
added light that thorough cross-examination 
sheds. We find therefore that the trial, court 
erred in limiting defendants' cross-
examination of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. 
The trial court did not limit those experts to 
comparisons to utility vehicles on their direct 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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examination. Hence cross-examination 
should not have been so restricted. 
IV. 
Defendants also contend that the trial court 
erred in excluding certain films and exhibits 
offered by them as evidence. They called a 
Mr. Heitzman as an expert witness to testify 
regarding the handling characteristics of Jeep 
vehicles. He offered a film showing CJ-5s 
successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers. 
Plaintiffs objected on the ground that the 
introduction of the film violated previous 
orders of the court regarding discovery. The 
objection was sustained. 
Plaintiffs had submitted interrogatories 
seeking any testing Jeep had done regarding 
the handling characteristics of the 1966-73 
Jeep Commando. At a hearing on plaintiffs' 
motion to compel discovery, Judge Sorenson 
ordered Jeep to respond to the interrogatory 
within thirty days. At trial, after hearing arg-
uments in chambers on the admissibility of the 
film, the court ruled: 
i* I think that in the context of all the 
circumstances and with respect to 
'•' discovery procedures ... I think the 
* plaintiffs were entitled to have, or 
see, the films and test results before 
trial pursuant to their discovery 
interrogatories ... , the films are not 
admissible. 
The trial court can exclude evidence that vio-
lates discovery orders under rule „ 37 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, 
defendants point out that the discovery 
covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep 
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep 
CJ-5. The film simply is not covered by the 
language of the interrogatory. Although plai-
ntiffs' experts were allowed at trial, over 
objections of defendants, to show films of CJ-
5s based on their foundational testimony that 
its handling was substantially similar to that of 
the Commando, that ruling does not place the 
film within the scope of material sought in the 
pretrial discovery request. The dissenting 
opinion would have defendants divine the 
scope of the requests by a trial court ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence which came much 
later. This burden cannot fairly be placed on 
them. The tests were not produced to show the 
handling of the "66-73 Jeep Commando/ 
nor were they offered for that purpose. Def-
endants maintained that the handling of the 
CJ-5 and the Commando were not the same. 
The tests were offered to rebut evidence pre-
sented by plaintiffs that the CJ-5 was defe-
ctive because of its handling characteristics. 
Although this evidence could have been excl-
uded on the basis of relevancy had the trial 
court earlier excluded plaintiffs' films, once 
the court allowed plaintiffs to try their case on 
the basis of comparison with the CJ-5, it 
CODE*Co 
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could not then refuse defendants the opport-
unity to rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in 
the presentation of their case. The trial court 
erred in excluding the film on the basis that 
defendants had failed to comply with orders 
regarding discovery. 
Defendants offered a second film in conju-
nction with Heitzman's testimony. This film 
showed non-Jeep vehicles doing mechanically 
induced rollovers similar to those shown in 
plaintiffs' film. After excluding defendants' 
first film for failure to produce it in discovery, 
the trial court ruled that this second film was 
not admissible, stating: 
Now, the other one rests on a dif-
ferent principle, I think. And the 
question that I have there is, the 
relevancy of it and whatever else 
you might want to raise. 
The evidence was offered to rebut the tests 
shown on plaintiffs' films and to demonstrate 
that there was no design defect in the Com-
mando because virtually any vehicle would roll 
when subjected to such tests. 
We have no quarrel with the rule of law 
relied upon in the dissenting opinion that 
"evidence of the condition of other products is 
irrelevant and not admissible to establish a 
defect in a. particular product." This is a 
sound rule when properly applied as it was in 
the cases cited in the dissenting opinion. For 
example, in Clark v. Detroit & Mackinac Ry., 
197 Mich. 489, 163 N.W. 964 (1917), a 
"rowboat rented from the defendant capsized, 
causing four minors to drown. The Michigan 
court held that it was error to attempt to 
prove the unseaworthiness of the capsized boat 
by admitting evidence of the various condit-
ions of repair of the other boats kept for hire 
by the defendant. 
Similarly, in Detroit, T.& I. R.R. v. 
Banning, 173 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 
338 U.S. 815 (1949), also cited in the dissen-
ting opinion, the plaintiff, a railroad brak-
eman, was injured while making a flying 
switch. He brought suit against his employer 
railroad, contending that the boxcar in which 
he was riding and which he was required to 
slow down by applying a hand brake had been 
pushed too fast by the engine, making it 
impossible for him to adequately slow down 
the boxcar, which was to couple with a stan-
ding car. At trial, plaintiff was allowed to 
testify that although he had previously made 
twenty-five to thirty flying switches, none of 
them were made at a rate of speed as high as 
the one in which he was injured. On appeal, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it 
was error to have admitted the plaintiffs 
testimony. Said the court: 
No foundation was laid to show the 
circumstances, distance, grade or 
other conditions of such previous 
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operations. We believe the testi-
mony was improperly admitted. 
Several factors can affect the speed 
at the time of impact, variable 
under different operations, irresp-
ective of the initial speed given to 
the free rolling cars. It is a well-
established rule of evidence that 
circumstances under which other 
comparable conduct occurs should 
be substantially similar. Wigmore 
on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. II, 
§§459, 460 [and citing other 
.-':' cases]. 
Banning, 173 F.2d at 756. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced 
films of Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this 
opinion, we upheld the admissibility of those 
films because of the substantial similarity of 
the vehicle shown in the films to the vehicle in 
which plaintiffs were injured. However, plai-
ntiffs in presenting their case did not stop 
there. They produced several experts who 
repeatedly in their testimony drew compari-
sons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles 
to non-Jeep vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to 
show that the Jeep in which they were riding 
was of an unsafe design and had a tendency to 
roll much easier than other vehicles. For 
•example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testi-
fied: "There is no doubt that this vehicle is 
much more prone to roll over than some 
others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. 
Noettl, testified that "it was very difficult to 
turn a passenger car. over." Finally, Mr. 
Anderson, another of plaintiffs' experts, tes-
tified that Jeep vehicles have "a delay in the 
handling response" that is greater than S10 
Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the rule 
of law relied upon by the dissenting opinion, 
that evidence of the condition of other prod-
ucts is not admissible to establish a defect in a 
particular product, it may be questioned 
whether such comparisons should have been 
admitted because of the lack of similarity. 
..... However, right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts 
were allowed to draw the comparisons between 
the rollover propensities of Jeep and non-
Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, defendants 
should have been allowed in rebuttal to prove 
the experience of plaintiffs' experts and to 
introduce into evidence the film showing non-
Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced rol-
lovers similar to those shown in plaintiffs' 
film. This situation is wholly different from 
the situations in the two above cases relied 
upon in the dissenting opinion where the pla-
intiff was not allowed to make comparisons 
when the circumstances were dissimilar. 
The third film that'defendants claim was 
wrongfully excluded was offered as exhibit 
No. 174, a video produced by defendants' 
expert, Dr. Warner. It consisted of two parts: 
the first showed a 1972 Jeep Commando 
31 
conducting a drive-through of the accident 
scene, and the second showed the same vehicle 
with outriggers attached doing maneuvers in a 
parking lot. The trial court ruled that the first 
part of the film was not probative of any 
issue. We agree. The second part was excluded 
because the test was not made until after the 
trial had commenced, in violation of pretrial 
orders regarding discovery. Counsel for defe-
ndants stated that No. 174 was offered to 
show the handling characteristics of the 1972 
Commando. Clearly, it came within the scope 
of plaintiffs' interrogatories and was properly 
excluded for failure to respond to discovery. 
In conjunction with exhibit No. 174, the 
trial court viewed a film of a 1970 Ford in a 
rollover test (exhibit No. 175). Defendants 
offered No. 175 to demonstrate the movement 
of vehicle occupants during a rollover. The 
trial court determined that the film was not 
probative and excluded it. The film was diss-
imilar to the accident, was not necessary to 
rebut any evidence offered by plaintiffs, and 
was not probative of any disputed issue. There 
was therefore no error in the exclusion of 
defendants' exhibit No. 175. 
Defendants' expert, Dr. Warner, offered 
exhibit No. 130, a storyboard, to illustrate his 
testimony that the vehicle in question had been 
involved in a prior accident that compromised 
the structural integrity of the roof. Plaintiffs' 
counsel objected, claiming that the exhibit was 
not material. The trial court sustained the 
objection. Plaintiffs' experts had testified that 
the roof of the vehicle was defectively desi-
gned, thus contributing to plaintiffs' injuries. 
Evidence illustrating how the roof had been 
damaged in a prior accident was relevant to 
rebut this assertion. The trial court erred in 
sustaining plaintiffs' objection to exhibit No. 
130. 
Defendants also offered exhibit No. 164, a 
series of five photographs showing live models 
posed in a static vehicle to represent passenger 
movement in a rollover. This was offered to 
illustrate the testimony of Dr. Warner that the 
movement of the passengers, not the design of 
the vehicle, caused the injuries. The trial court 
initially admitted and then excluded the 
exhibit, stating: 
The probative value is limited at 
least because of the photographs 
not being representative of just 
what did happen to the vehicles ... 
or the people in them. 
While it is not clear whether the basis of the 
trial court's ruling was relevance, Utah R. 
Evid. 401, or that the probative value was 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, etc., Utah R. Evid. 
403, we will uphold the trial court's ruling 
where there is any valid basis to do so. State 
v. Cray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
Here the trial court could have properly exci-
I HTAM invANirr UFPCIPTQ 
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uded the evidence under either theory; there-
fore, we find no error in «the exclusion of 
exhibit No. 164. 
V. 
. Defendants also contend that the trial court 
erred in excluding all references to the avail-
ability of seatbelts and plaintiffs' failure to 
use them. Plaintiffs made a motion in limine 
to exclude all evidence of seatbelts. The trial 
court excluded such evidence, stating: 
[T]o speculate what the seatbelt 
might have done in this type of 
situation is just something that the 
jury ought not to, and they will not 
have, under my ruling, the obliga-
tion to consider .... I want no more 
evidence in this case with regard to 
seatbelts. 
Defendants contend that the evidence of sea-
tbelts was relevant and necessary to show (1) 
that their presence was a factor the jury 
should consider when determining if the 
vehicle was unsafe as designed, and (2) that 
plaintiffs' injuries could have been prevented 
or lessened by the use of seatbelts and there-
fore the jury should be allowed to determine 
whether plaintiffs' duty of ordinary care or 
their duty to mitigate damages required them 
to wear seatbelts. 
' We agree that evidence of how the presence 
of seatbelts affected the design safety of the 
vehicle should be admitted. However, the bulk 
of defendants' proffered evidence and the 
main thrust of their argument regarding seat-
belts was directed at plaintiffs' failure to use 
them as constituting contributory negligence or 
failure to mitigate damages. The majority of 
the cases cited in the briefs submitted to this 
Court have rejected this approach. See Kopi-
schke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 
471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980) (for citations to 
other jurisdictions which have rejected this 
approach). More persuasively, the legislature 
has passed Utah Code Ann. §41-6-186 
(1988), which provides: 
The failure to wear a seat belt does 
not constitute contributory or 
comparative negligence and may not 
be introduced as evidence in any 
civil litigation on the issue of inju-
ries or on the issue of mitigation of 
damages. 
Although this statute was passed subsequent to 
the litigation sub judice and was therefore not 
controlling at trial, we nonetheless decline to 
place ourselves in the awkward position of 
adopting a stance that is in direct contraven-
tion of express legislation. We therefore find 
that the trial court did not err in excluding 
evidence that the failure to use seatbelts con-
stituted contributory negligence or failure to 
mitigate damages. 
VI. 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
states that error may not be predicated upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affe-
cted. In .the instant case, the trial court erro-
neously excluded evidence offered by defend-
ants. That evidence was necessary to rebut the 
assertions that plaintiffs made to establish 
liability. This error was compounded by 
unduly restricting the scope of defendants' 
cross-examination. Given the conflicting 
testimony presented on this key issue, we 
cannot say that the substantial rights of defe-
ndants were not affected by the combined 
effects of the erroneous exclusion of the evi-
dence and the limitation of cross-
examination. While no one error by itself 
perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative 
effect of the several errors undermines our 
confidence that defendants were able to 
present to the jury their theory of the case and 
that a fair trial was had. 
We therefore reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1- Variable Annuity Life Insurance has filed a sep-
arate appeal on the issue of vicarious liability. See 
Whitehead v v Variable Annuity Life Insurance. Co., 
101 Utah Adv. Rep 24, decided also today. 
2. Judge Sorensen, after hearing most of the pretrial 
matters, retired and did not preside at the trial. 
STEWART; Justice: (Dissenting) 
After a two- and one-half-week trial 
which produced some 5,000 pages of transc-
ript, a verdict was returned for plaintiff 
Stephen Whitehead for damages produced by 
the tragic and permanent injuries suffered in 
the rollover of a Jeep Commando. The Court 
reverses the jury verdict and judgment on the 
basis of a few evidentiary rulings culled from 
a host of such rulings. The Court holds that 
the trial court erred in (1) limiting defendants' 
cross-examination, and (2) excluding defen-
dants* films. I submit that the trial court was 
clearly correct and that, in any event, the 
rulings fall within a trial judge's discretion. 
For these reasons, I dissent. 
L LIMITATIONS OF DEFENDANTS' 
I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
The majority holds that -the trial court 
improperly limited defendants' cross-
examination of plaintiffs' experts. The maj-
ority cites three instances in which the trial 
court "cut o f f defendants' attempts to cross-
examine plaintiffs' experts and which preve-
nted defendants from probing the basis of 
opinions given by plaintiffs' experts. 
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This Court has long held that the trial court 
has considerable discretion in determining 
whether evidence is relevant. Bambrough v. 
Betters, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). The 
judgment of the trial court in admitting or 
excluding evidence should not be reversed 
absent an abuse of discretion, and only when 
the error is prejudicial. State v. Miller, 727 
P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. McClain, 706 
P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); Terry v. Zion's Coop. 
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
Generally, evidence of the condition of other 
products is irrelevant and not admissible to 
establish a defect in a particular product. See 
Detroit, T. & I. R.R. v. Banning, 173 F.2d 
752, 756 (6th Cir.), cerf. denied, 338 U.S. 815 
(1949); Clark v. Detroit & M. Ry., 197 Mich. 
489, 503, 163 N.W. 964, 968 (1917); 29 Am. 
JUT. 2d Evidence §302, at 348 (1967); 32 
C.J.S. Evidence §583, at 712 (1964). Thus, it 
is. irrelevant whether the Jeep Commando was 
unreasonably dangerous compared with other 
makes or models of automobiles generally. 
The only relevant inquiry is the turnover 
characteristics of the Jeep Commando and 
other vehicles substantially similar to it.1 
In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion by ruling that the scope of cross-
examination would include only comparisons 
of vehicles with the same or similar characte-
ristics as the Jeep Commando. The court, 
during the course of the trial, reminded defe-
ndants' counsel that only evidence of similar 
T vehicles would be admitted: 
tj.«4 
-].... The Court: I don't think I've 
prohibited any kind of cross exa-
mination with reference to vehicles 
that had the same or similar char-
acteristics; to-wit: center of gravity 
and wheel width, that Jeep has. 
Mr. Mandlebaum [attorney for 
defendant AMC/Jeep]: Well, I 
may be incorrect. But I believe you 
have, your Honor. I thought the 
Court's ruling was that we could 
not compare other vehicles. 
•;\' The Court: No. The only ruling 
;* that I have made with regard to 
r :; that, at least, at least that's my 
'intent, was that unless the vehicles 
were similar, that I wasn't going to 
permit you to compare them in 
order to show that other vehicles 
might be as dangerous as this 
vehicle. 
The majority now holds that the trial 
court's limitations on cross-examination 
interfered with defendants' ability to attack 
the foundation of the opinions of plaintiffs' 
expert witnesses. Defendant was allowed, 
however, to introduce such evidence when it 
was intended to go to credibility, as shown 
below. 
The majority cites three examples of the 
trial court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-
examination. The examples cited do not prove 
that there was a limitation of cross-
examination as to any "critical aspect of pla-
intiffs' proof." In light of the trial court's 
ruling that only evidence of vehicles with the 
same or substantially similar characteristics 
would be admissible, evidence of other non-
similar types of vehicles was inadmissible 
absent some special relevancy. 
Every ruling criticized by the majority was 
in fact required by the court's pretrial ruling, 
yet the majority does not even discuss the 
validity of that ruling. Indeed, the majority's 
view of this case would allow defendants to 
delve into the rollover -characteristics of every 
single type of four-wheeled passenger vehicle 
on the road. Such a ruling would have made it 
virtually impossible to try this case. It is, of 
course, self-evident that all four-wheeled 
vehicles can be rolled over. Whether a vehicle 
is defectively designed depends upon whether 
the vehicle is dangerous when used under the 
ordinary conditions of its intended use. That 
should be determined by examining vehicles 
that are designed for similar purposes, i.e., 
utility vehicles in this case, as the trial judge 
ruled. In my view, the majority undermines 
the trial judge's ability to manage a case such 
as this by permitting defendant to explore on 
cross-examination matters of highly attenu-
ated relevancy. 
The majority's first example of limitation 
of cross-examination arises out of plaintiffs' 
expert's testimony on direct examination 
concerning the "handling characteristics of 
Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7s." On 
direct examination, the expert stated: 
Q: And what type of handling 
and maneuvering tests did you 
perform last week? 
- A: Well, I had some instrument 
tests that I performed on four dif-
ferent vehicles. I had a CJ-5, a CJ-
7, a small Blazer, the new F10 [sicj 
size Blazer, and the Chevy Chev-
ette. 
Q: And what did the results show 
in regard to your tests on the Jeep 
itself? 
A: Well, all the results are preli-
minary. I don't have all the data 
reduced yet. But my preliminary 
quick look at that data indicates 
that the Jeep vehicles both overturn 
at speeds of 20 to 25 miles an hour, 
and they both have a delay in the 
handling response that's in the 
magnitude of a half a second before 
the vehicle is stabilized to turn. 
The other vehicles I tested, the 
S10 Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, 
they did not have delays of that 
magnitude. They were much less. 
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The majority cites the following, which occu-
rred in the context of the above testimony, as 
a limitation of cross-examination: 
Q: Are there other vehicles that 
have the same track width-
Mr. Howard [plaintiffs* counsel]: 
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained on the grounds 
it's irrelevant. 
Q: Are there other vehicles that 
have about the same center of 
gravity? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's 
irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: If you drive a three-quarter-
ton pickup, is it the same as driving 
a Honda Accord; handling, stee-
ring? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's 
irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: [TJake another vehicle that 
has wider track width and lower 
[center of gravity], can it be rolled 
on a level surface with driver-
[steering] input? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's 
irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Defendants' attempted cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' expert went far beyond the scope of 
the trial judge's order limiting the evidence 
and also beyond the scope of direct examina-
tion. There was no testimony on direct conc-
erning the rollover propensities, track width, 
or center of gravity of "other vehicles" in 
general. The only testimony given on direct 
examination related to the 'handling resp-
onse" time of the CJ-5, CJ-7, S10 Blazer, 
and Chevy Chevette, all of which are utility 
vehicles having general characteristics substa-
ntially similar to the Jeep Commando. I 
submit that the trial court did not err in limi-
ting cross-examination. 
The second example cited by the majority of 
improper limitation of cross-examination 
occurred in the following exchange on defen-
dants' cross-examination of plaintiffs' 
expert: 
Q: What experience have you had 
in trying to roll over a passenger 
vehicle? 
Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]: 
Object on the basis of relevancy. 
Court: I don't want to get into 
testing all other kinds of vehicles, 
because we've got enough problems 
with the one. So, I'm going to 
sustain the objection. 
CODE• Co 
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The cross-examination question above was 
based on an assumption made by plaintiffs' 
expert and found in the following direct exa-
mination: 
Q: When you started out with 
this particular test, did you know 
exactly what speeds and what input 
it would take to turn the CJ-5 
over? 
A: No, absolutely. It was just the 
opposite. That the belief was, that 
since it was very difficult to turn a 
passenger car over, especially on a 
flat surface at low speeds, that it 
would be difficult to do this with a 
Jeep, too. 
As is evident from the above, plaintiffs' 
expert did not purport to have experience in 
testing or researching the rollover propensities 
of "passenger cars/ nor did he claim to have 
experience in rolling vehicles other than the CJ-
5. He clearly stated that he started with the 
belief thai since it was difficult to roll a pas-
senger car, it would also be difficult to roll a 
CJ-5. The testimony on direct examination 
only made passing reference to "passenger 
cars." The focus of the examination clearly 
was not on the rollover propensity of passe-
nger cars* land the trial judge was clearly 
within the ambit of reasonable discretion in 
susta in ing the object ion on cross-
examination..
 £'r. 
Nevertheless,'after sustaining the objection 
as to "passenger cars," the court allowed 
defendant AMC to cross-examine about 
"utility vehicles" because of their substantial 
similarity to the CJ-5 and the Jeep Comm-
ando: 
Mr. Jensen [attorney for defend-
ants]: 
What about the vehicles similar 
to the CJ-5; that is utility vehi-
cles? The Scout, Landcruiser, and 
that class of vehicles? The small 
pickups, narrow and with equiva-
lent center of gravity? 
. Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]: 
Object on the basis of relevance and 
foundation. Outside the scope of 
direct. 
• The Court: What is the relev-
ance? 
Mr. Jensen: Similar vehicles, 
Your Honor. 
The Court: The same width, the 
same-
Mr. Jensen: Similar track width 
and center of gravity. 
The Court: You may answer. 
Thus, there was no limitation on cross-
examination about substantially similar vehi-
cles. 
The majority's third example of an impr-
I \ 
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1 oper limitation of cross-examination, if read 
in context, reveals that the judge sustained an 
) objection that went only to the form of the 
question. Since a question that is barred 
because of its form may always be rephrased, 
and since defendants' question was not reph-
rased, it simply is not true that the trial court 
limited cross-examination in this instance. In 
the following testimony, the focus of cross-
examination was on a direct, straight-on rear-
end collision to a vehicle without any lateral 
forces: 
•- Q: So would you expect that 
•Y iv vehicle to stay on the road? 
A: Again, under a hypothetical 
thing where you just have an impact 
from the rear, no lateral forces are 
put in, yes, it will stay right on the 
road. 
Q: No problem at all staying on 
the road? 
A: No problem at all. 
Q: The driver just rides it out and 
no problem? 
A: Under those conditions I 
described, yes. If you have no 
" lateral forces acting on the vehicle, 
;! [noj side forces, the vehicle isn't 
| - .*;;*' going to turn over. 
f ^ 1 , Q: AH "gin. That would apply 
k. : ^ - Whether it's a Commando or some 
"
r
'
:J
.."'""other vehicle? 
, \;;, A: In my opinion, that's correct. 
r i
 Q: All right. And what distance 
would it take for a driver to get 
that vehicle under control, and 
*r. could he do it within the width of 
three lanes of the freeway? 
Mr. Johnson: Outside the scope, 
Your Honor. We object to it. Sec-
ondly, the facts of this case are 
clearly lateral force. The evidence at 
this point is uncontroverted that six 
inches, the Oldsmobile hit six inches 
of the Jeep on a specific corner. We 
don't have a direct back input. 
/" The Court: I'm going to take an 
.afternoon recess at this time. I'll 
t -overrule your objection with respect 
•""} to it not being within the scope of 
- t h e direct examination. But I will 
#
 sustain it with regard to the form of 
the question. And when we come 
back you may go from there. 
Q [By Mr. Jensen]: Thank you, 
Your Honor. 
I think we were talking about 
what you would expect to happen 
to the Commando or any vehicle 
that's hit under the circumstances 
that you have been describing? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And do you feel like any 
35 
vehicle would come out of that sit-
uation unscathed, basically? 
Mr. Johnson: Your Honor, the 
Court sustained the objection as to 
the form of the question. 
The Court: And I'll sustain the 
objection to that question. 
Besides asking about the effect of a direct rear 
impact without lateral forces, the question was 
ambiguous and too broad and, at the least, 
should have been restated. The trial court 
acted well within its discretion, and in any 
event, the incident is unimportant to the 
outcome of the trial. 
In fact, full cross-examination of plaint-
iffs' experts' qualifications and experience 
was allowed.2 For example, Mr. Jensen, 
counsel for AMC/Jeep, cross-examined Mr. 
Noettl, plaintiffs' expert, on his knowledge of 
vehicle rollover literature. Mr. Noettl identi-
fied various tests, reports, and studies conce-
rning vehicle rollover thresholds and vehicle 
characteristics. Overruling plaintiffs' objection 
to a question concerning the rollover propen-
sity of big trucks, the court stated: 
Overruled. It may or may not be. 
I have not changed my ruling with 
respect to other matters, in permi-
tting him to go into this. This may 
have something to do with credibi-
lity, veracity, accuracy,, or what-
ever. 
The cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, 
another of plaintiffs' experts, also demonstr-
ates that defendants were not prevented from 
questioning an expert about his experience and 
qualifications. 
This Court has ruled that counsel should 
make clear to the trial judge the relevance of 
cross-examination questions when an objec-
tion is sustained on relevancy grounds. Stare 
v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986). See 
aiso State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 
1986). In none of the present instances where 
the majority rules that the trial court impro-
perly sustained plaintiffs' objections to ques-
tions regarding other vehicles did defense 
counsel state the relevance of those questions. 
Absent an explanation of the relevance of the 
line of inquiry, exclusion was properly called 
for under the pretrial ruling, which certainly 
was within the discretion of the court. If, 
indeed, the point was to attack the foundation 
of the expert's opinion-and not to confuse 
the substantive issue of determining whether 
the Commando was defective-that should 
have been explained to the trial court. Other-
wise, the trial court was certainly entitled to 
assume that defendants sought to circumvent 
the judge's ruling on relevancy. 
II. EXCLUSION OF FILMS 
The trial court's decision to exclude defen-
dants' test films was also clearly within its Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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discretion. One film portrayed non-Jeep 
vehicles performing mechanically induced 
rollovers in a manner somewhat similar to 
those shown in plaintiffs' film. The court 
ruled: 
[IJt's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant 
because they involve other vehicles 
which the jury would have to take 
into consideration as to how it was 
done, the comparisons, the whole 
works. 
And the other witnesses have seen 
the Jeep film. And I've let him 
testify with regard to his version of 
those tests with regard to the Jeep. 
I kept out the other because I 
thought they were irrelevant on the 
issue as to whether or not the Jeep 
was defectively designed, and I still 
think it is. 
Because each of those tests are -
they have a - they're not all 
exactly the same. You don't even 
have the same vehicle. And we'd 
have to determine the reliability of 
the tests for each individual car or . 
automobile. And I'm not going to 
, letthejurydothat. 
Defendants argued before the trial court that 
plaintiffs had at least three different tests or 
films in evidence showing different vehicles 
making different maneuvers, all of which 
involved different steering inputs at different 
speeds. The judge responded that those tests 
and films were admitted because expert testi-
mony established that the vehicles depicted in 
the films were substantially the same as the 
Jeep Commando involved in this case: 
- The Court: That's the only reason. 
The rest of them were out. And 
I'm going to keep them all out. 
-The majority holds that because plaintiffs' 
experts were allowed to draw the comparisons 
between the rollover propensities of Jeep and 
non-Jeep vehicles, defendants should also 
have been allowed to introduce a film of non-
Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced rol-
lovers. As stated earlier, evidence of the con-
dition of other products is generally not 
admissible to prove a defect in a particular 
product. See Banning, 173 F.2d at 756; Clark, 
197 Mich, at 503, 163 N.W. at 968; 29 Am. 
Jur. Evidence §302; 32 C.J.S. Evidence 
§583. Such evidence is admissible, however, 
when the products are substantially similar. 
There is no evidence that defendants' film 
showed vehicles which were substantially 
similar. Plaintiffs' film, however, was of 
vehicles substantially similar to the Jeep 
Commando. 
In addition, the majority rules that the trial 
i Motors Sales Corp. CODE^ CO 
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court erred in excluding defendants' film of a 
Jeep CJ-5 on the basis that it violated a 
discovery order directing defendants to answer 
an interrogatory that would have disclosed the 
existence of the film. The majority states: 
'[Defendants point out that the discovery 
covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep 
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep 
CJ-5. The film simply is not covered by the 
language of the interrogatory." I submit the 
majority is simply in error in stating that the 
interrogatory did not cover the film. The int-
errogatory directed defendants to "state 
whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep 
Corporation tested for or otherwise determ-
ined the handling characteristics and qualities 
of said automobiles [Commandos] both during 
the development and subsequently to the 
initial production ...." 
The interrogatory specifically requested 
information as to all tests, even those subse-
quent to production, to determine the hand-
ling characteristics and qualities of the Com-
mando. Defendants' tests of the Jeep CJ-5 
were, in fact, used to determine the handling 
characteristics and qualities of the Jeep 
Commando, contrary to the assertion of the 
majority that the films were not offered for 
the purpose of showing the handling of the 
'66-73 Commando. The CJ-5 was shown 
by foundational testimony to be substantially 
similar to the Jeep Commando. A vehicle is 
substantially similar only if it has substantially 
the same characteristics and qualities. The 
interrogatory requested information concer-
ning not only the subsequent testing of Com-
mandos^ but also the testing for, or otherwise 
determining, the characteristics or qualities of 
the Commando. Such testing included the CJ-
5 because it had many of the same character-
istics and qualities of a Commando. Other-
wise, the CJ-5 film would have been irrele-
vant to defendants' case and inadmissible.3 
The majority claims, however, that defen-
dants were forced to "divine the scope-of the 
requests by a trial court ruling on the admis-
sibility of evidence which came much later." 
Defendants were instructed, weeks before trial, 
that they could cross-examine but were "not 
to bring up new facts which were not given 
plaintiffs' counsel in their response to interr-
ogatories." Given the purpose of submitting 
the CJ-5 film-to show the characteristics 
of the Commando-defendants had prior 
notice and should not be able to influence the 
outcome of this long and difficult case by 
surprise. The tests of the CJ-5 clearly fell 
within the scope of the interrogatory in ques-
tion. The trial court properly excluded the test 
film on the ground that defendants failed to 
comply with discovery orders based on that 
interrogatory. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1284-85 (Wyo. 
1983) (exclusion of defendants' rollover film 
for violation of discovery order was within Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Cl rk Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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broad discretion of trial court). 
Finally, the majority opinion states that it 
was improper for the trial court to exclude 
exhibit No. 130, a storyboard illustrating 
defendants' expert's testimony "that the 
vehicle in question had been involved in a 
prior accident that compromised the structural 
integrity of the roof." This question goes more 
to damages rather than liability. Its admissi-
bility turned on a whole host of variables. 
Determination of admissibility is in the trial 
judge's discretion. 
- Durham, Justice, concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart. 
1. The majority opinion concedes that only films 
showing accidents of a similar nature are admissible* 
and that the trial court correctly excluded one of 
defendants' films on this basis. However, the maj-
ority appears to reject the proposition that the scope 
of both direct and cross-examination may be pro-
perly limited to similar vehicles. 
2. On a related point, the majority accepts AMC's 
contention that 
not allowing them to cross-examine 
Anderson with regard to characteristics 
_ of other vehicles and how they would 
V. . react under the conditions depicted in 
\;; • plaintiffs' film left unchallenged the 
: r?V assertions that track width and center of 
^-gravity were the essential characteristics 
in determining a vehicle's rollover sus-
• ceptibility and that Jeeps were more 
v dangerous than other vehicles'because 
their track width was narrower and their 
center of gravity higher. 
That is not correct. Defendants elicited such evid-
ence from its own expert witness, Edward Heit-
zman. Heitzman testified at length concerning the 
factors that determine the susceptibility to rollover 
of vehicles in general. Heitzman testified about 
numerous other vehicles (including both utility 
vehicles and passenger cars) which have a center of 
gravity equal to or higher than the Jeep Commando. 
Heitzman also testified extensively about the static 
stability ratio, which was relied on by plaintiffs' 
experts, to determine a vehicle's propensity to roll 
over. In fact, Heitzman had a list of vehicles with 
their static stability ratios which formed the basis 
for his testimony regarding the comparison of the 
Jeep with other vehicles. After extensive discussion, 
the list itself was admitted into evidence. 
3. Defendants claim now on appeal that *[i]t was a 
film made in 1983 of a Jeep CJ-5 and had nothing 
to do with the 1972 Commando.r (Emphasis in 
original.) If that is true, we should affirm the trial 
court's order on grounds of irrelevancy. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Julie Warren VERDE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20954 
FILED: February 3,1989 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
ATTORNEYS: 
Robert Van Sciver, Margo L. James, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Earl F. Dorius, Salt Lake 
City, for appellee 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Julie Verde appeals from her 
conviction, following a jury trial, of the, 
offense of the sale of a child. See Utah Code 
Ann. §76-7-203 (1978). She claims that 
certain evidence was improperly admitted, that 
the jury was improperly instructed, and that 
there was insufficient evidence on one element 
of the crime. We affirm. 
We recite the facts from the .record on 
appeal in the light most favorable to the 
jurys verdict. CL, e.g., State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985); Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985); Sugar v. Miller, 6 Utah 2d 433, 
436, 315 P.2d 862, 864 (1957) (all addressing 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence). 
Verde met the State's chief witness, Tammy 
Watson, at the physician's office where 
Watson worked and Verde was being treated.. 
After hearing that Watson had recently suff-
ered a miscarriage, Verde approached hex 
about the possibility of arranging for the 
private adoption of a third party's child., 
Verde and Watson continued discussing the 
proposed adoption on a regular basis from. 
September of 1984 until February of 1985. 
In these discussions, Verde indicated that 
Watson should expect to incur medical, legal, 
and other costs incident to the adoption 
ranging between $2,500 and S5,000. During 
this period, Watson arranged to pay J80 to 
$90 of Verde's medical care costs in return for 
Verde's commitment to give her a "discount" 
on the adoption expenses. Verde claimed that 
she was in the process of setting up a private 
adoption agency and was working with a local 
attorney. However, Verde presented no corr-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Sch ol, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, for: 
HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST SOO NORTH S T R U T 
P. O. Box 7 7 8 
PROVO. UTAH 84601 
TELEPHONE: 3 7 3 * 6 3 4 5 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEVEN 
WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
and AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORA-
TION, JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
INTERROGATORIES 
SJdk 
Civil No. 5>rG3lf 
Plaintiffs submit herewith the following interrogatories to be 
answered by the defendant according to the provisions of Rule 33 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under oath and within thirty (30) 
days of service hereof. These interrogatories are intended to be 
continuing so as to require a supplementation of response to the 
full extent required in Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
DEFINITIONS 
The definitions set forth below shall be used for the purposes 
of these interrogatories. 
L. The term "you" or "your" shall mean and include the defen-
dant and any employee, officer, agent, attorney or other individual 
under the control of American Motors Corporation, Jeep Corporation. 
2. The term "document" shall mean and include any letter, 
telegram, note, memorandum, record, operating statement, balance 
sheet, budget, contract, invoice, order, memorandum of any tele-
i 1-7 
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phone or personal conference or conversation, inter-office memoran-
dum, microfilm, booklet, circular, pamphlet, study, notice, compute 
run- or print-out, tape recording of any statement or conversation 
or transcription of any mechanically recorded statement or conversa-
tion and any other writing of any nature, however produced or repro-
duced, including copies of such documents (excepting those documents 
prepared by legal counsel solely for the purpose of this litigation) 
3. The term "identify" when used in relation to the term docu-
ments, shaLl require the defendant to state with regard to each 
(document so designated: 
a. The date of the documents; 
b. The description of the document in sufficient detail tcj> 
|enabLe it to be specifically identified? 
c. The name of the author of the document; 
d. The name and business adress of the persons presently 
|having custody of the documents; 
e. The name and business address of each person having 
[knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in said document. 
f. The name of each recipient of the doucment; 
g. A statement explaining in reasonable detail the con-
tents of the document. 
4. The term "identify" when used in referring to individuals 
or business entities shall mean and require the defendant to state 
with regard to each individual so designated: 
a. The name of the individual or business entity; 
b. The present office or home address; 
c. The individual's present employer. 
5. The term "identify" when use in relation to the terms 
"test", "studies", or "evaluations", shall require the defendant 
with regard to each test, study or evaluation so designated: 
a. The approximate date such tests, studies, or evalua-
tions were accomplished; 
-2- 1.1Q 
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b. The names and addresses of the personnel who con-
ducted such test, studies, or evaluations; 
c. The results obtained in conducting such tests, studies 
or evaluations; 
d. List any written reports or memoranda which were pre-
pared on the basis of such tests, studies or evaluations; 
e. The names and addresses of the personnel who prepared 
or authored the* documents mentioned in subparagraph d above; 
f. The present location and name of the custodian of such 
documents mentioned in subparagraph d above and attach copies. 
6. Each paragraph and subparagraph of these interrogatories 
shall be construed independently and not by reference to any other 
paragraph or subparagraph for purposes of limitation. 
INTERROGATORIES 
L. Please identify the person answering these interrogatories 
and his relationship or position with defedant. 
2. Identify the total number, broken down by make, model/ 
series, and model year of "Jeep Comando" vehicles manufactured by 
American Motors Company, Jeep Corporation (hereinafter American 
Motors). 
3. With respect to the vehicles indicated in the previous 
interrogatory, please identify all of the vehicles by year and 
model which were sold without 1) roll bars, or, 2) lap, shoulder, or 
harness type seat belts. 
4. With respect to the vehicles indicated in interrogatory #2, 
please indicate by model and year, the number of vehicles sold with 
canvas, fiberglass, or other non-rigid cab enclosures. 
5. With respect to the vehicles indicated in the three pre-
vious interrogatories, please furnish the number of all owner report 
or consumer complaints from all sources either received by American 
Motors or of which American Motors, is aware alleging injury or 
fatality as a result of the malfunction or lack of a safety roll 
-3-
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belts. Include all reports or complaints, whether or not they have 
been verified by American Motors. 
6. With respect to each owner report or consumer complaint 
referred to in answer to the previous interrogatory, please identify 
the contents of each and every document in accordance with the defin 
tions preceding these interrogatories. 
7. Please furnish the number of all owner reports or consumer 
[complaints from all sources either received by American Motors 
|or of which American Motors is otherwise aware alleging injury or 
fatality resulting from on-toad accidents involving roll-over of 
[jeep vehicles or uncontrollability thereof. Include all reports or 
complaints, whether or not they have been verified by American 
plotors Corporation. 
8. With respect to each* owner report or consumer complaint 
[referred to in answer to the previous interrogatory, identify the 
bontents of each and every document in accordance with the defini-
tions preceeding these interrogatories. In the alternative, attach 
|a copy of the designated documents. 
9. Specify what investigations American Motors Corporation 
[undertook in regard to each of the accidents, injuries and/or 
fatalities, identified in answer to interrogatory #7. 
10. Specify with particularity the results of American Motor's 
investigation into the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities identi-
fied in answer to interrogatory #7. 
11. Identify all lawsuits, both pending and closed by title, 
jcoutt, location and docket number in which American Motors is 
jr was a defendant against allegations of malfunction or failure 
|of the types listed in interrogatory #5. 
12. Identify all claims, both pending and closed, by name and 
[address of the claimant in which American Motors was requested to 
bay damages because of allegations of malfunction or failure of the 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
S3 
^z 
Kbi. 
bJ < g 
Ui 5 t- o ^ 
"0« g n 
dxfjw 
z
 " * * £ 
*88-5j 
3 i 1 ° o g 
. < 
Q w ui 
< z SI 
IE 
:
 g a! > S 0 w 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
21 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
types indicated in interrogatory #5. 
13. State what amount, if any, American Motors paid on each of 
the claims identified in the previous interrogatory. 
14. State the name and addresses of all persons or groups of 
persons at American Motors who. participated in the design, manu-
facture and sell of the Jeep Commando automobile. Give the approxi-
mate date of such decision. 
15. State the names and addresses of all persons or groups of 
bersons at American Motors who designed and planned the complete 
structure and unit of the Jeep Commando automobile. Give the proxim 
pnd inclusive dates when the above was accomplished. 
16. With reference to the design, planning, and manufacture of 
[the complete structure and unit of the Jeep Commando automobile, giv 
|the following information: 
a. List by American Motors index number, the plans, 
bngineoring drawings, and blueprints prepared for the development of 
paid automobiles; (describe the subject on each print, drawing or 
pludpr int) 
b. List the plans, engineering drawings, blueprints and 
specifications in their completed or final form that were used for 
the production and assembly stages for said automobiles; (describe 
the subject on each print, drawing or blueprint) 
c. The names and addresses of the person, persons or grou 
of persons who authored, prepared, supervised and approved the 
documents mentioned in a and b above; 
d. The approximate dates the documents mentioned in a 
and b above were prepared, completed and approved; 
e. The present location and name and address of the 
custodian of the documents mentioned in (a) and (b) above. 
17. State whether American Motors determined the approximate 
or exact position of the center of gravity for any or all Jeep 
Commando autmobiles for the model years 1970-77 inclusive, under 
i a i 
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[different passenger load conditions. 
IB. If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the 
(affirmative, please state the approximate, or if known, the exact 
location of the center of gravity in the Jeep Commando automobiles 
produced for the model years 1970-77 inclusive, for passenger load 
ponditions varying from 0-4 passengers inclusive. 
19. State the approximate standard passenger weight employed 
in answering the previous interrogatory, and also the passenger dis-
tribution pattern in the automobiles for each model. 
20. State the approximate, or if known, the exact location of 
the center of gravity on a certain 1972 Jeep Comando, VIN JLA 87H 
1/H21309, for all passenger load conditions varying from 0-4 
passengers inclusive. 
21. With reference to the design and development of the Jeep 
ominando automobile, state whether American Motors Corporation testecj 
ifor or otherwise determined the handling characteristics and 
Qualities of said automobiles both during the development and sub-
equently to the initial production of said automobiles. 
22. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
[affirmative, please identify any such tests in accordance with 
the definitions preceeding these interrogatories. 
23. If the answer to interrogatory #21 is in the affirmative, 
|please supply the following additional information: 
a. With respect to the handling qualities and charac-
teristics of said Jeep Commando autmobiles, what safety standards 
land criteria were utilized by American Motors Corporation in 
[designing and developing said automobiles; 
b. Whether American Motors Corporation tested for or 
[evaluated the tendency of said Jeep Comando automobiles to either 
understeer or oversteer at different operating conditions; 
c. If the answer to b above is in the affirmative, state 
specifically how such tests and evaluations were accomplished. 
-6-
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24. State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for 
or otiiorwise evaluated the directional stability or handling charac-
teristics of the Jeep Commando automobile under impact conditions, 
2'5. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify all such tests and/or evaluations in accord-
ance with the definitions preceeding these interrogatories. 
26. State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested 
for or otherwise evaluated the operational directional stability 
|or handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando automobile under 
real or simulated cross wind conditions during the development of 
[said automobiles or subsequently to the initial production of said 
[automobiles. 
27. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
|af fc" imative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
pith the definitions preceeding these interrogatories. 
28. State whether American Motors Corporation tested for or 
(otherwise evaluated the aero-dynamic properties of the Jeep Commando 
automobile during the development of said automobiles or subsequent 
to the initial production said automobiles. 
29. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
of f: irmat ive, please identify such tests and/or evaluations in 
[accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
30. State what instructions were included in any manual or 
(other document which was given to the consumer or purchaser or any 
Jeep Commando automobile which stated any particular problem or 
(problems relating to vehicle handling characteristics which might 
be encountered in driving or operating said automobiles. Please 
put line in detail such instructions or attach a copy thereof. 
31. State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for 
br otherwise evaluated the effect of safety roll bars in Jeep 
(Commando automobiles as related to the prevention of physical in-
juries and/or fatalities to the passengers in said automobiles in 
-7-
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the event of a roll-over or other accident, 
32. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
|with the definitions preceeding these interrogatories. 
33. State if American Motors Corporation decided to install 
troll bars in the Jeep Commando automobile after the model year 1972, 
[and if such decision was made, state the grounds upon which it was 
Imade • 
34. State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for 
br otherwise evaluated the affect of the short wheel base of the Jee 
Commando automobile on its resistance to roll-over either during the 
Uevelopment of said automobiles or subsequent to the initial 
(production of said automobiles. 
35. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
laf f irmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
ftfith the definitions preceeding these interrogatories. 
36. State whether American Motors Corporation has tested for 
lor otherwise evaluated the effect of the track width of the Jeep 
(Commando automobile on its resistance to roll-over, either during 
the development of said automobile or subsequent to the initial 
production of said automobiles. 
37. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceeding these interrogatories. 
38. State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for 
or otherwise evaluated the affect of the suspension system of the 
Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to roll-over, either 
during the development of said automobiles or subsequent to the 
initial production of said automobiles. 
JL(J. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
1Drl 
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40. State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested 
for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the installation of seat 
belts (either lap, shoulder, or harness type) on the prevention or 
mitigation of physical injuries arising out of automobile accidents 
involving the Jeep Commando, 
41. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
42. State whether American Motors Corporation has, subsequent 
to the 1972 model year of the Jeep Commando, installed seat belts 
(either lap, should or harness type) in any models of the Jeep 
|Commando, and if so, state the reasons therefore. 
43. State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested or 
[otherwise evaluated the strength and/or crash-worthiness of the 
pab enclosures utilized in the production of the Jeep Commando auto-
mobile, model years 1970-77 inclusive. 
44. if the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the 
(affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
|with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
45. If the answer to interrogatry #43 is in the affirmative, 
state in addition whether American Motors Corporation ever tested or 
otherwise evaluated the potential for physical injury and/or fatalit 
resulting from the cab enclosure of the Jeep Commando, if said 
automobile were involved in an automobile accident. 
46. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, please identify such tests and/or evaluation in 
accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
47. Identify all present or former employees of American Motor 
Coroporation who participated in the acutal test driving of the Jeep 
Commando automobile at any of the American Motors proving ground 
facilities during the development stages and also subsequently to 
the initial production of said automobiles. 
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48. How many accidents in which Jeep Commando automobiles have 
been involved have been reported to American Motors Corporation 
|where the general complaint has been that said automobiles have 
unexpectedly gone out of control or overturned? 
49. In reference to the previous interrogatory, supply the 
following information: 
a. Identify each such accident by the name of the person 
[alleged to have been operating the vehicle in question, and the name 
pf the owner of said vehicle, and the date and place of the occur-
rence of the accident, and the license number of each and every 
(vehicle involved; 
b. State whether any of said accident have resulted in 
jlitigation, and if so, identify said litigation by the name of the 
plaintiffs and defendants, the court in which the action is pending, 
p docket number, date of filing complaint, and disposition of the 
lease. 
50. State whether American Motors Corporation employs one or 
Inore automobile safety engineers on the engineering staff of 
[American Motors Corporation, Jeep Corporation. 
51. If the answer to the proceeding interrogatory is in the 
J L1. ima t ive, identify such persons in accordance with the definitions 
preceding these interrogatories. 
52. Did American Motors Corporation engage any outside 
engineering services with respect to the development or manufacture 
|of the Jeep Commando automobile for the production model years 1970-
inclusive? 
53. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such engineering services in accordance with 
the definitions regarding the identification of persons which preced 
these interrogatories. 
54. State each and every warranty in particular, whether 
express or implied and whether oral or written, made to each and 
-10-
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every person who has ever purchased a Jeep Commando automobile 
for the production model years of 1970-77 inclusive. 
55. With reference to the previous interrogatory, state the 
following information: 
a. The substance of each such warranty; 
b. State whether the warranty was express or implied; 
c. State whether the warranty was written or oral; 
d. State the persons or persons to whom such warranties 
were made; 
e. State the tenure of the person or persons making such 
warranties; 
f. State the name and address of the person or persons 
to whom such warranties were made. 
56. State whether American Motors Corporation has ever 
promulgated any warnings to authorized Jeep dealers and/or purchaser 
of the Jeep Commando automobile for the production models years 1970 
inclusive as to any probleMS related to the following information: 
a. Handling characteristics; 
b. Roll over propensity; 
c. Safety roll bars; 
d. Seat belts (lap, shoulder or harness type). 
57. If the answer to any part of the previous interrogatory is 
in the affirmative, please supply the following information: 
a. State in detail the particulars and contents of such 
warnings; 
b. The name and address of each person so warned; 
c. The dates such warnings were made to the people 
described in b above. 
d. Whether such warning was oral or in writing; 
e. The name and address of the person or persons who 
made such warnings. 
58. State whether any tests were ever conducted by American 
-11-
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Motors Corporation at any of its proving ground facilities on the 
Jeep Commando automobile wherein said automobile was deliberately or 
accidentally rolled over to determine the following qualities of 
said automboiles: 
Body resistance to impact; 
Handling characteristics; 
Performance characteristics for different conditions 
a. 
b. 
c. 
of: 
Braking; 
Acceleration; 
Deceleration; 
Cornering ability, 
59. If the answer to any part of the preceding interrogatories 
in the affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in 
accordance} with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
DATED this // day of March, 1981. 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Interrogatories to Mr. Jay E. 
Jensen, Attorney for defendant Jeep Corporation, 900 Keatns Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; Mr. Timothy R. Hanson, Attorney for 
VALIC, 650 Clark Leaming Office Center, 175 South West Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84L01; Mr. Thomas A Duff in, Attotney for Defendant 
Anderson, Ten West Broadway Bldg, Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101; dated this _/J_ day of March, 1981. 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, F o r : 
H O W A R D . LEWIS 8t PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST 3 0 0 NORTH STREET 
P. O. Box 778 
PROVO. UTAH 84601 
TeLEPHONB: 3 7 3 - 6 3 4 8 
Attorneys for_ Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEVEN 
WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
[ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
klsID AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORA-
TION, JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
INTERROGATORIES 
TO DEFENDANT AMERICAN MOTORS 
Civil No. 5*,036 
Plaintiffs submit herewith the following interrogatories to be 
answered by the defendant according to the provisions of Rule 3 3 of 
jthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under oath and within thirty (30) 
Llays of service hereof. These interrogatories are intended to be 
[continuing so as to require a supplementation of response to the 
full, extent required in Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce 
Mure. 
DEFINITIONS 
The definitions set forth below shall be used for the purposes 
jf the.se interrogatories. 
L. The term "you" or "your" shall mean and include the defen-
dant and any employee, officer, agent, attorney or other individual 
[indet the control of American Motors Corporation, Jeep Corporation. 
2. The term "document" shall mean and include any letter, 
[telegram, note, memorandu, record, operating statement, balance 
^heet, budget, contract, invoice, order, memorandum of any tele-
phone ot personal conference or conversation, inter-office memoran-
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dun, microfilm, booklet, circular, pamphlet, study, notice, computer 
run- or print-out, tape recording of any statement or conversation 
or transcription of any mechanically recorded statement or conversa-
tion and any other writing of any nature, however produced or repro-
duced, including copies of such documents (excepting those documents 
prepared by legal counsel solely for the purpose of this litigation. )| 
3. The term "identify" when used in relation to the term docu-
ments, shall require the defendant to state with regard to each 
document so designated: 
a. The date of the documents; 
b. The description of the document in sufficient detail 
to enable it to be specifically identified; 
c. The name of the author of the document; 
d. The name and business address of the persons presently 
having custody of the documents; 
e. The name and business address of each person having 
knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in said document; 
f. The name of each recipient of the document; 
g. A statement explaining in reasonable detail the con-
tents of the document. 
4. The term "identify" when used in referring to individuals 
or business entities shall mean and require the defendant to state 
with regard to each individual so designated: 
a. The name of the individual or business entity; 
b. The present office or home address; 
d. The individual's present employer. 
5. The term "identify" when used in relation to the terms 
"test", "studies", or "evaluations", shall require the defendant 
with regard to each test, study or evaluation so designated: 
a. The approximate date such tests, studies or evaluation^ 
were accomplished; 
b. The names and addresses of the personnel who con-
-?-
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ducted such test, studies, or evaluations; 
c. The results obtained in conducting such tests, studies,) 
or evaluations; 
d. List any written reports or memoranda which were pre-
pared on the basis of such tests, studies or evaluations; 
e. The names and addresses of the pesonnel who prepared 
or authored the documents mentioned in subparagraph d above; 
f. The present location and name of the custodian of suc4i 
document mentioned in subparagraph d above and attach copies. 
6, Each paragraph and subparagraph of these interrogatories 
shall be construed independently and not by reference to any other 
paragraph or subparagraphs for purposes of limitation. 
INTERROGATORIES 
1. Please identify tiie person answering these interrogatories 
and his relationship or position with defendant. 
2. With regard to all Jeep Commando vehicles manufactured by 
the defendant American Motors Company or its subsidiary Jeep 
Corporation for the model years 1970-1973, please furnish the 
number of all owner reports or consumer complaints from all sources 
either received by American Motors or of which American Motors is 
aware, alleging injury or fatality as a result of the malfunction 
or Lack of (1) a safety roll bar, or (2) non-rigid cab enclosures, 
including both non-rigid roofs and doors. Include all reports or 
complaints, whether or not they have been verified by American Motor^ 
3. With respect to each owner report or consumer complaint 
referred to in answer to the previous interrogatory, please identify 
the contents of each and ovory document in accot dance* with the defi-
nitions preceding these interrogatories. 
4. Please furnish the number of all owner reports or consumer 
complaints from all sources either received by American Motors 
or of which American Motors is otherwise aware alleging injury or 
fatality resuLting from on-road accidents involving roll-over of 
-3-
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Jeep Commando vehicles ot uncontrollability thereof for the model 
years 1970-73. Include all reports or complaints, whether or not 
they have been verified by American Motors Corporation. 
5. With respect to each owner report or consumer complaint 
referred to in answer .to the previous interrogatory, identify the 
contents of each and every document in accordance with the defini-
tions preceding these interrogatories. In the alternative, attach 
a copy of the designated documents. 
6. With regard to the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities 
identified in an answer to interrogatories #2 and 4, specify what 
investigations American Motors Corporation undertook in regard to 
[each of said accidents. 
7. If American Motors did not undertake any investigation or 
|other action with regard to the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities) 
identified in interrogatories #s 2 and 4 but has access to investi-
gations undertaken by Jeep Cot potation involving Jeep Commando 
vehicles for the model years 1970-73 involving the conditions identi 
fied in interrogatories #2, and 4 please identify the contents of 
each and every such document in accordance with the definitions 
preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, attach a cop^ 
of said documents. 
8. Identify all lawsuits, both pending and closed by title, 
court, Location and docket number in which American Motors or Jeep 
Coiporntion is or was a defendant against allegations of malfunction 
ot failure of the types listed in interrogatories #2 and 4 involving 
Jeep Commando vehicles for the model years 1970-73. 
9. Identify all claims, both pending and closed, by name and 
address of the cLaimant in which American Motors was requested to 
pay damages because of allegations of malfunction or failure of the 
types indicated in interrogatoties #1, 2 and 4. 
10. State what amount, if any, American Motors paid on each of 
the claims identified in the previous interrogatory. 
4
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11. State the names and addresses of all persons or groups of 
persons at American Motors who have participated in any design 
changes in the Jeep Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73. 
Give the approximate date when said design changes were accomplished 
L2. Identify the plans, engineering drawings, blueprints and 
specifications in their completed or final form that were utilized 
in the production and assembly stages for the following components 
of the Jeep Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73: 
a. The roof enclosure; 
b. The wheel base and drive-train; 
c. The track width of both front and rear axles; 
d. Any roll bar or other protective device designed to 
prevent roof collapse; 
e. Steering mechanism; 
f. Stablizer bars; 
g. Suspension systems; 
h. Brakes. 
13. With regard to the documents referred to in the previous 
interrogatory, identify in accordance with the definitions preceding 
these interrogatories the names and addresses of the person, persons 
|or group of persons who authored, prepared, supervised and approved 
MM* documents. 
14. State whether American Motors has access to documents whic 
reflect testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commando automobile 
for the model years 1970-73 which determined the approximate or 
exact position of the center of gravity for said vehicles under 
different passenger load conditions. 
15. If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the 
affirmative, please state the approximate, or if known, the exact 
Location of the center of gravity in the Jeep Commando automobiles 
(produced for the model years 1970-73 inclusive, for passenger load 
conditions varying from 0-4 passengers inclusive, or in the alter-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0
 2 
S* 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
native, attach a copy of said documents. 
16. State the approximate standard passenger weight employed 
in answering the previous inter rogatory, and also the passenger 
distribution pattern in the automobiles for each model. 
17. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
documents which reflect testing by the Jeep Corporation of the Jeep 
Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73 to evaluate the 
tendency of said automobile to either undetsteer or oversteer at 
different operating conditions. 
IB. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory was in 
the affirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the 
(definitions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative 
attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
19. State whether American Motors Corporation lias access to 
[documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep 
Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73 evaluating the 
[operational directional stability or handling characteristics of 
said automobile under real or simulated cross wind conditions. 
20. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
la f f ir mat ive, identify such documents and/or evaluations in accordance^ 
with the definitions ptecoding these interrogatories or in the 
[alternative attach a copy of the same to your answers to interroga-
tor ies. 
21. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
[documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep 
[Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73 evaluating the 
jaero-dynamic stability of said automobiles. 
22. It" the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
laffit mativef please identify such documents in accordance with the 
definitions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative 
[attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
23. State what instructions were included in any manual or 
-6- 243 
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other document which was given to the consumer of a certain 1972 
Jeep Commando, VIN JLA 87H VH21309, which stated any particular 
problem or problems relating to vehicle handling characteristics 
jwhich might be encountered in driving or operating said automobiles 
Please outline in detail such instructions or attach a copy thereof 
24. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
[documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandcj 
automobile for the model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of 
safety loll bars in said automobiles as related to the prevention of 
physical injuries and/or fatalities to the passengers in said 
lautomobiles in the event of a roll-over or other accident. 
25. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
|affirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the defini-
tions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative attach 
|a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
26. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
(documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandd 
iautomobiLe for model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of the short) 
|wheel base of said automobile on its resistance to toll-over. 
27. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
|aft irmative, identify such documents in accordance with the defini-
tions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative attach a 
k:opy of same to yout answers to interrogatories. 
28. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc 
'automobile Cor model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of the 
track width of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to 
roll-over. 
29. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
laffirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the 
(definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, 
attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
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30. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc! 
automobile Cot model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of the 
suspension system of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance 
to roll-over. 
31. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the 
[definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, 
attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
32. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
|documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc) 
for the model years 1970-7 3 evaluating the strength and/or crash-
Iworthiness of the cab enclosures utilized in the production of said 
lautomobi les. 
33. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the 
laffitmative, identify such documents in accordance with the 
jdefinitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, 
jattach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
34. tf the answer to interrogatory #33 is in the affirmative, 
state in addition whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc 
automobile for model years 1970-73 evaluating the potential for 
physical injury and/or fatality resulting from the cab enclosure of 
said automobile, if said automobile were inovlved in an accident. 
35. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the 
af I: it mat ive, please identify such documents in accordance with the 
definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, 
attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories. 
36. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
documents in the possession of Jeep Corporation reflecting the 
identity of all present or former employees of American Motors 
Corporation who participated in the actual test-driving of the Jeep 
- f t -
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Commando automobile for model years 1970-73. 
37. If the answers to the preceding interrogatory was in the 
affirmative, please identify such documents in accordance with the 
definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, 
attach a copy of the same to your answers to interrogatories. 
38. State whether American Motors Corporation has access to 
documents reflecting the identities of the engineering firms and/or 
individual engineers responsible for the design of the wheel base, 
track width, suspension system, and cab enclosures for the Jeep 
(Commando automobile. 
39. If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the 
[affirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the defini-
tions regarding the identification of persons which precede these 
inter rogator ies. 
DATED this day of September, 1981. 
<£ riCHARD B. JOHNSOiy For: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Interrogatories to Mr. Jay E. 
|Jensen, Attorney for defendant Jeep Corporation, 900 Kearns Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; Mr. Timothy R. Hanson, Attorney for 
VALIC, 650 Clark Learning Office Center, 175 South West Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 8410L; Mr. Thomas A. Duffin, Attorney for Defendant 
Anderson, Ten West Broadway Bldg., Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101; Mr. Glen Hanni, Attorney at Law, 600 Boston Bldg., Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111; dated this /^ day of September, 1981. 
QJb* /0U„ 
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RICflARD B. JOHNSON, FOR: 
H O W A R D , LEWIS 8e PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
1 2 0 EAST 3 0 0 NORTH STREET 
P. O. BOX 7 7 8 
PROVO. UTAH 8 4 6 0 1 
TELEPHONE: 3 7 3 . 6 3 4 8 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEVEN 
WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
AND AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORA-
TION, JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
INTERROGATORIES 
TO DEFENDANT JEEP CORPORATION 
Civil No. 34-T-eerj— 
Plaintiffs submit herewith the following inter rogatories to be 
answered by the defendant Jeep Corporation according to the pro-
visions of Ruie 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under oath 
• * 
|and within thirty (30) days of service hereof. These interroga-
tories are intended to be continuing so as to require a supple-
mentation of response to the full extent required in Rule 26(e) of 
the Utah Rules of CiviL Procedure. 
DEFINITIONS 
The definitions set forth below shall be used for the purposes 
|of these interrogatories. 
L. The term "you" or "your" shall mean and include the defen-
dant and any employee, officet, agent, attorney or other individual 
pndei the control of Jeep Corporation. 
2. When an interrogatory requests information regarding 
(testing or investigation by Jeep Corporation on the Jeep Commando 
hutomobiie, such request includes a request for all testing done on 
Jeep Commando automobiles for the model years 1966-73, including 
9&' 
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testing done by Jeep Corporation's predecessor, Kaiser Jeep 
Corporation. 
3. The term "document" shall mean and include any letter, 
telegram, note, memorandum, record, operating statement, balance 
sheet, budget, contract, invoice, order, memorandum of any tele-
phone or personal conference or conversation, inter-office memoran-
dun, microfilm, booklet, circular, pamphlet, study, notice, computer-
tun- or- print-out, tape recording of any statement or conversation 
or transcription of any mechanically recorded statement or conversa-
tion and any other writing of any nature, however produced or repro-
duced, including copies of such documents (excepting those documents 
prepared by legal counsel solely for the purpose of this litigation.)] 
4. The term "identify" when used in relation to the term docu-
ments, shall require the defendant to state with regard to each 
{document so designated: 
a« The date of the documents; 
b. The descr iption of the document in sufficient detail 
to enable it to be specifically identified; 
c. The name of the author of the document; 
d. The name and business address of the persons presently 
having custody of the documents; 
e. The name and business address of each person having 
knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in said document; 
f. The name of each recipient of the document; 
g. A statement explaining in reasonable detail the con-
tents of the document. 
5. The term "identify" when used in referring to individuals 
[or business entities shall mean and require the defendant to state 
with regard to each individual so designated: 
a. The name of the individual or- business entity; 
b. The present office or home address; 
c. The individual's present employer. 
-2-
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6. The term "identify" when used in relation to the terms 
"test", "studies", or "evaluations", shall require the defendant 
with regard to each test, study or evaluation so designated: 
a. The approximate date such tests, studies or evaluation*! 
were accomplished; 
b. The names and addresses of the personnel who con-
ducted such test, studies, or evaluations; 
c. The results obtained in conducting such tests, studies 
or evaluations; 
d. List any written reports or memoranda which were pre-
pared on the basis of such tests, studies or evaluations; 
e. The names and addresses of the pesonnel who prepared 
oi ntithot cd the documents mentioned in subparagraph d above; 
f. The present location and name of the custodian of such 
document mentioned in subparagraph d above and attach copies. 
7. Each paragraph and subparagraph of these interrogatories 
shall be construed independently and not by reference to any other 
paragraph or subpaiagraphs for purposes of limitation. 
INTERROGATORIES 
1. Please identify the person answering these interrogatories 
and his relationship or position with defendant. 
2. With regard to ail Jeep Commando vehicles manufactured 
by Jeep Corporation for model years 1966-73, please furnish the 
number of all owner reports or consumer complaints from all sources 
either received by Jeep Corporation or of which Jeep Corporation 
is aware alleging injury or fatality as a result of the malfunction 
or lack of (1) a safety roll bar; (2) non-rigid cab enclosures, 
including both non-rigid roofs and doors; or (3) general instability 
causing roll-overs. Include all reports or complaints, whether or 
not they have been veiified by Jeep Corporation. 
3. With respect to each owner report or consumer complaint 
referied to in answer to the pievious interrogatory, please identify 
-3-
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the contents of each and every document in accordance with the 
definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
4. Specify what inveshigat ions.Jeep Corporation undertook 
in regard to each of the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities, 
identified in ans-wer to interrogatory #2. 
5. Specify with particularity the results of Jeep Corporation' sj 
investigation into the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities identi-
fied in answer to interrogatory #2. 
6. Identify all lawsuits, both pending and closed by title, 
court, Location and docket number in which Jeep Corporation is or 
was a defendant against allegations of malfunction or failure of 
the types listed in interrogatory #4, involving Jeep Commando 
vehicles for the model years 1966-73. 
7. Identify all claims, both pending and closed, by name and 
address of the claimant in which Jeep Corporation was requested to 
pay damages because of aiiegations of malfunction or- failure of the 
types indicated in interrogatory 2. 
8. State what amount, if any, Jeep Corporation paid on each of 
the claims identified in the previous interrogatory. 
9. State the name and addresses of all persons or groups of 
persons at Jeep Corporation and Kaiser Jeep Corporation who par-
ticipated in the design, manufacture and sale of the Jeep Commando 
automobile for the model years 1966-73. 
10. Identify the plans, engineering drawings, blue prints and 
specifications in their completed or final form that were utilized 
in the production and assembly stages for the following components 
of the Jcr.p Commando automobile for the model years 1966-73: 
a. The roof enclosure; 
b. The wheel base and drive-train; 
c. The track width of both front and rear axels; 
d. Any roll bar or other protective device designed to 
prevent roof collapse; 
-4-
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e. Steeting mechanism; 
f. Stabilizer bars; 
g. Suspension systems; 
h. Brakes. 
11. With regard to the documents referred to in the previous 
interrogatoryr identify in accordance with the definitions preceding 
these interrogatories the names and addresses of the person, persons 
or group of pet sons who authored, prepared, supervised and approved 
the documents. 
12. State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
determined the approximate or exact position of the center of gravit 
for any or all Jeep Commando automobiles for the model years 1966-73 
inclusive, under different passenger load conditions. 
13. If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the 
affirmative, please state the approximate, or if known, the exact 
location of the center of gravity in the Jeep Commando automobiles 
produced for the model years 1966-73 inclusive, for passenger load 
conditions varying from 0-4 passengers inclusive. 
14. State the approximate standard passenger weight employed 
in answering the previous intetrogatory, and also the passenger dis-
tribution pattern in the automobiles for each model. 
1 r>. State the approximate, or iE known, the exact location of 
the center of gravity on a certain 1972 Jeep Commando, VIN JLA 87H 
VH21309, for all passenger load conditions varying from 0-4 pas-
sengers inclusive. 
16. With reference to the design and development of the Jeep 
Commando automobile for model years 1966-73, state whether Jeep 
Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation tested for or otherwise 
leteimined the handling characteristics and qualities of said 
[automobiles both during the development and subsequently to the 
initial production of said automobiles. 
17. If the answer to interrogatory #18 is in the affirmative, 
-5-
9Z\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
si 
K< t 
U en M 
S BC g 
^ * « 
n «J * w 
" • U J N 
e» g £ rs 
W 3 z g 
^Sg" 
U Q O O 
- I Z h . 
- < 5 a. 
Q u> in 
< 2 ° 
* s -
OO 
x$ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
55 15 
to o 
<t to 
w
 « i a i £ 1 6 
.< n 
1
 b w 
> t 
0 w 
£» 18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
please supply the following additional information: 
a. With respect to the handling qualities and charac-
teristics of said Jeep Commando automobiles, what safety standards 
and criteria were utiLized by Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Cor-
poration in designing and developing said automobiles; 
b. Whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
tested for or evaluated the tendency of said Jeep Commando auto-
mobi Les for the model years 1966-73 to either under steer or over-
steer at different operating conditions; 
c. If the answer to b above is in the affirmative, state 
specifically how such tests and evaluations were accomplished. 
18. State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the directional stability or 
handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando automobile for model 
years 1966-73 under impact conditions. 
19. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify all such tests and/or evaluations in accord-
ance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
20. State whethoi Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the operational directional 
stability or handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando for the 
model years 1966-73 automobile under real or simulated cross wind 
conditions. 
21. If the answer- to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
22. State whether' Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the aerodynamic stability of 
the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73. 
23. If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the 
affirmative, please identify such tests and/or- evaluations in 
accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
-6-
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24. State what instructions were included in any manual or 
other document which was given to the consumer of a certain 1972 
Jeep Commando automobile VIN JLA 87H VH21309 which stated any par-
ticular problem or problems relating to vehicle handling character-
istics which might be encountered in driving or operating said 
automobiles. Please outline in detail such instructions or attach 
a copy thereof. 
25. State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of safety roll 
bars in Jeep Commando automobiles for model years 1966-73 as related 
to the prevention of physical injuries and/ or fatalities to the 
passengers in said automobiles in the event of a roll-over or other 
accident. 
26. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
27. State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the short wheel 
base of the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73 on its 
resistance to roll-over- either during the development of said 
automobiles or subsequent to the initial production of said 
automobiles. 
2ft. Tf the answer- to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
29. State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the track width 
jof the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73 on its 
resistance to roll-over , either during the development of said 
automobiLe or subsequent to the initial production of said 
automobiles. 
30. rf the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
-7-
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affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
31. State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the suspension 
system of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to roll-
over, for model yearn 1966-73. 
32. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
33. State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
ever tested or otherwise evaluated the strength and/or crash-
worthiness of the cab enclosures utilized in the production of the 
Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73. 
34. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance 
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
35. If the answer to interrogatory #33 is in the affirmative, 
state in addition whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Cor-
poration ever tested or otherwise evaluated the potential for physic. 
injury and/or fatality resulting from the cab enclosure of the Jeep 
Commando, if said automobile were involved in an automobile accident 
for model years 1966-73. 
36. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, please identify such tests and/or evaluation in accord-
ance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
37. Identify a L1 present or former employees of Jeep Cor-
poration or Kaiser Jeep Corporation who participated in the actual 
test (hiving of the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73 
at any proving ground facilities during the development stages and 
aLso subsequently to the initial production of said automobiles. 
38. State how many accidents in which Jeep Commando automobiles 
for model years 1966-73 have been involved have been reported to 
-8-
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Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation where the general 
complaint has been that said automobiles have unexpectedly gone out 
of control or overturned. 
39. In reference to the previous interrogatory, supply the 
folLowing information: 
a. Identify each such accident by the name of the person 
alleged to have been operating the vehicle in question, and the name 
of the owner of said vehicle, and the date and place of the occur-
rence of the accident, and the license number of each and every 
vehicle involved; 
b. State whether any of said accident have resulted in 
litigation, and if so, identify said litigation by the name of the 
plaintiffs and defendants, the court in which the action is pending, 
a docket number , date of filing complaint, and disposition of the 
case . 
40. State whether Jeep Corporation or- Kaiser Jeep Corporation 
has ever promulgated any warnings to authorize Jeep dealers and/or 
purchasers of the Jeep Commando automobile for the production models 
years 1966-73 inclusive as to any problems related to the following 
information: 
a. Handling characteristics; 
b. Roil over propensity; 
c. Safety roll bars; 
41. If the answer to any part of the previous interrogatory is 
in the affirmative, please supply the following information: 
a. State in detail the particulars and contents of such 
war ni ngs ; 
b. The name and address of each person so warned; 
c. The dates such warnings were made to the people 
described in b above. 
d. Whether- such warning was oral or in writing; 
e. The name and address of the person or persons who 
occ: 
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made such warnings. 
42. State whether any tests were ever conducted by Jeep Cor-
poration or Kaiser Jeep Corporation at any of its proving ground 
facilities on the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73 
wherein said automobile was deliberately or accidentaily rolled over 
to determine the following qualities of said automobiles: 
a. Body resistance to impact; 
b. Handling characteristics; 
c. Performance characteristics for different conditions 
of: 
1. Braking; 
2. Acceleration; 
3. D e c e l e r a t i o n ; 
4. Cornering ability. 
43. If the answer to any part of the preceding interrogatories 
is in the affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in 
accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories. 
DATED this £§ day of <^tX\WmSA , 1981. 
RICHARD B. JOHNSC^T, FOR: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Glen Hanni, Attorney 
at Law, 600 Boston Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111; Mr.- Jay E. 
Jensen, Attorney for defendant American Motors, 900 Kearns Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 8410L; Mr. Timothy R. Hanson, Attorney for 
defendant VALIC, 650 Clark Learning Office Center, 175 South West 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101; and Mr. Thomas A. Duffin, 
Attoiney tor defendant Anderson, Ten West Broadway Bldg., Suite 410, 
SaLt Lake City, Utah, 84101, postage prepaid, this c^/day of 
1981. 
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RICHARD . ' HNSON, FOR: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST 300 NORTH STREET 
P. O. BOX 778 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 
TELEPHONE: 3 7 3 - 6 3 4 3 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s ,,/ 
J^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAirCOUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEPHEN : 
WHITEHEAD, 
: INTERROGATORIES 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
!ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Jand AMERICAN MOTOR SALES 
CORPORATION, JEEP CORPORATION,: 
I Defendants. : Civil No. 53046 
The plaintiffs herebv request that the defendant, Jeep Cor-
poration, answer the following interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure within thirtv (30) davs of 
service hereof. These interrogatories' are to be deemed continuing 
so as to require a supplementation of response to the full extent 
specified in Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. Please state the name of each person who vou expect mav b 
called as an expert witness on behalf of the plaintiffs at the 
trial of this cause of action against the above-named defendants. 
I 2. For each such expert as named above in the preceding 
'interrogator, please state: 
A. His or her name, or other means of identification, 
address and present telephone number. 
3. His or her profession or occupation, and the field in 
S£ 
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C. The name or desc r ip t ion of the products , ob jec t s , 
i 
documents, records, memoranda, correspondence, or anv other tangible 
corn of documentation, recordation or communication which was 
analvzed or examined. 
D. Whether vou intend to call him as a witness during 
the trial of this cause, of action. 
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING INTERROGATORIES SEPARATELY FOR EACH PERSON 
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iPERSON 3Y NAME. 
3. Has the expert, had a formal education in his or her field? 
4. If so, state: 
A. The name and address of each school where he or she 
received special education or training in this field. 
B. The dates when he attended each school. 
C. The name or description of each degree he received, 
including the date when each was received and the name of the 
school from which he received said degree. 
5. Did he have anv other specialized training in his field? 
6. If so, state: 
A. The tvpe of training he received. 
3. The name and address of the school or place where he 
received this training. 
C. The dates when he received this training. 
7. Is he or she a member of anv professional or trade associ.a-
OOrO 
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ion in his or her field? 
8. If so, state: 
A. The name of each professional or trade association. 
3. The date he or she became a member thereof. 
C. A description of each office he or she has held in 
each association. 
9. Has he or she written anv books, papers, or articles on 
subject to his field? 
10. If so, for each book, paper, and article, state: 
A. The title and subject matter thereof. 
B. The name and address of the publisher. 
C. The date of publication. 
11. Has he or she practiced or worked in the field which he 
jclaims to be an expert in during the past ten vears? 
12. If so, state: 
A. Whether he was self-employed, emploved bv someone 
else, or associated as a partner. 
3. Each address where he practiced or was emploved. 
C. The dates he was with each emplover. 
D. The tvpe of dutv he performed with each emplover. 
13. If he has not practiced or worked in his field during 
the last ten vears, what was his emplovment during this time. 
14. What experience, other than that stated above, has he had 
in his field. 
15. Has he had anv previous experience in his field which 
~
3
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[involved problems to chose encountered in thsi action? 
! 15. If so, describe each similar problem with which he has had 
[ i 
| experience? 
I 17. Identifv, with specificitv, each and everv document, 
[memoranda, correspondence, record, or other tangible form of docu-
mentation, recordation, or communication which have been submitted 
!to, or made available to him or her for purposes of forming an 
opinion relative to the issues which have been raised in the com-
plaint filed in this cause of action, including but not limited to * 
llost earnings, loss of prospective income, and damages. 
"18. What facts or information were vou seeking in having said 
[examinations conducted? . * < 
19. Did this expert submit a report of his objective findings/ 
| 20. If so, state: 
i * 
j A. The date this report was submitted. i 
I 3. The name or other identification of the person to 
whom this report was submitted. 
C. The name and address of the person who has present 4 
custodv of this report. 
21. Did he submit anv other reports whatsoever, based on the 
tests analvses, or examinations that he conducted relevant to this . 
lawsuit. 
22. If so, state with particularitv: 
A. A description of each report that was made. 
i 
B. The date that each report was made. j 
I -4- omJ 
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C. The name or other means of identification, the person 
to whom each report was submitted. 
D. The name and address of the person who has present 
custodv of each report. 
DATED this 3 dav of August:, 1983. 
^U^L**/^ ^h^s\^ 
RICHARD 3. JOHNSON, FOR: 
HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attornevs for Plaintiffs 
MAILED a copv of the foregoing INTERROGATORIES to: 
Mr. Jav Jensen 
Attorney for Defendant American Sales 
and Jeep Corporation 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84101 
Mr. J. Anthonv Evre 
Attornev for Plaintiffs 
600 Commercial Club 3uilding 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 8411 
Mr. Glenn C. Hanni 
Attornev at Law 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Mr. Thomas A. Duffin 
Western Home Bank Bldg., 3rd Floor 
30 South State 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34111 
Attornevs for Defendant Anderson 
Mr. Terrv M. Plant 
Attornev for Defendant Variable Annuitv 
175 South West Temple #650 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34101 
dated this av of August, 1933. 
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Defendant Anderson's Interrogatories to 
Defendant American Motors/Jeep Corporation, 
dated April 5, 1983 
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Glenn C. Hanni 
Stuart H. Schultz 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant Anderson 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and ) 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIA3LE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE CO. ] 
and AMERICAN MOTOR SALES 
CORPORATION, JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT ANDERSON'S 
INTERROGATORIES TO DE?ENDANr 
AMERICAN MOTORS/JEEP 
CORPORATION 
Civil No. 53,046 
Defendant Larry Anderson, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, submits the following Interrogatories 
to defendant American Motors/Jeep Corporation, to be answered 
under oath and in writing within 30 days of the date of service 
hereof: 
1. State the name, address and telephone number of 
each and every person you may call as a witness at the trial 
of the above-captioned matter. Include a brief synopsis of the 
substance of each such person's testimony. 
2. State the name, address and telephone number of 
—-1-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
each and every person you may call as an expert witness at the 
trial of the above-captioned matter. Include a brief synopsis 
of the substance of such person's testimony, and set forth the 
qualifications, training, education, and experience of each 
such person. 
3. Identify each document or thing you may introduce 
as an exhibit at the trial of the above-captioned matter. 
Identify each such proposed exhibit by name, deposition exhibit 
number, or description of content, and also identify the present 
location of all such exhibits, and the person in control of 
such exhibits. 
DATED this 5th day of April, 1983. 
STRONG & HANNI 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of April, 1983 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Interrogatories were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
J. Anthony Eyre, Esq. 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Deborah Whitehead 
600 Commercial Club Buildincr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-2-
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Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box: 778 
Provo, Utah 84 601 
Thomas A, Duffin, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Anderson 
Western Home Bank Building 
Third Floor 
300 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jay E. Jensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant American 
Sales & Jeep Corporation 
900 Reams Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Terry M. Plant, Esq. 
Attorney for Variable Annuity Life 
Insurance Company 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Secretary \\ 
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